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Voting Behaviour and Public Opinion

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1. Introduction

A central tenet of democratic theory holds that public policy should be in accordance with citizens’ preferences (see Dahl 1971, 1989). A close relationship between public policy and public preferences in modern democracies cannot be taken for granted, however. Instead, it is an empirical issue whether the public policy decisions that are primarily made by elected elites closely correspond to citizens’ preferences (Powell 2000). The closeness of the mass-elite linkage depends, inter alia, upon whether elites have incentives to pay close attention to and be responsive to public preferences (see e.g. Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The incentives, in turn, depend on whether policy preferences play a role in citizens’ political behaviour. Leaving aside referenda on policy issues and issue-related direct political action, voting behaviour is of crucial importance for the linkage between citizen preferences and policy decisions. When casting their votes, citizens might signal policy salience to elites. To this end, they can vote in accordance with their policy preferences or with their evaluations of representatives’ prior performance. Thereby, they hold politicians accountable and provide them with incentives for policy responsiveness. If citizens do not rely on policy attitudes, however, politicians will hardly have any incentive to respond to public opinion when making policy decisions. As a result, the connection between public opinion and public policy is likely to become tenuous or even inexistent. The smooth working of representative democracy is thus an empirical issue (see as a classic Key 1961).

The field of public opinion and voting behaviour addresses important issues in this process of political representation in modern democracy. Scholars study the nature, sources, and dynamics of public opinion which they usually conceive of as the aggregation of citizen
attitudes as measured in surveys. Research on voting behaviour aims at describing and, primarily, explaining voting behaviour. In attempting to identify the determinants of electoral behaviour, many scholars explore the role of attitudes toward public policies. So this field contributes significantly to improving knowledge about the process of political decision-making in democracy.

This essay aims at giving an overview of research on public opinion and voting behaviour that is located at the intersection of several academic disciplines, including political science, psychology, and sociology. The overview starts by addressing research on voting behaviour. This section presents key models of voter choice and summarizes key findings. It then turns to the question of long-term electoral change. The next section deals with research on public opinion. Therein, the results of classic studies are presented as well as the debates they engendered. Then this section turns to the issue of the sources of public opinion and the implications of the respective findings for the notion of public opinion. The penultimate section explores recent developments and suggests directions for future research, both in substantive and methodological terms. The concluding section summarizes key findings and draws conclusion on the role of citizens in democracy.

2. Models of Voting Behaviour and Classical Findings

When elections became the vehicle for citizens to elect political elites, politicians, pundits, and scholars alike began to speculate about the factors driving voting behaviour. Leaving aside early works, e.g., Siegfried’s (1913) analysis of voting behaviour in France, the determinants of vote choice became a subject of scholarly studies in the mid-20th century. Building on data from surveys, scholars developed several models of voter choice. Given the
focus of this essay, the below review will put special emphasis on the role of public policy attitudes in affecting voting behaviour.

Utilizing data from an innovative seven-wave regional panel survey, Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues demonstrated in their ingenious analysis of electoral decision-making “The People’s Choice” that many voters had already made up their mind several months before the 1940 US-presidential election (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). They found only a small number of party changers during the campaign and thus concluded that the campaign primarily served to reinforce already existing political predispositions. Moreover, these political predispositions were found to be determined by stable socio-demographic characteristics, including SES, religious denomination, and place of residence. Their often-cited conclusion was thus: “A man thinks, politically, as he is, socially.” It is tempting to read the study as suggesting some kind of social-determinism. Yet, this interpretation is at odds with the authors’ line of argument which accounted for their findings in terms of interpersonal communication (see also Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Irrespective of this question, however, the evidence does not support the notion that public policy issues played a major role in vote choice.

Lazarsfeld et al.’s findings on US elections dovetail nicely with research on voting behaviour in Europe. Given the continent’s history, accounting for European voting behaviour in terms of social characteristics appears quite obvious. It thus does not come as a surprise that in their account of the evolution of Western European party systems Lipset and Rokkan introduced the concept of social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This concept was not designed to explain voting behaviour. Yet, it builds on the notion of social groupings regularly voting for particular parties, e.g., workers for socialist parties and Catholics for Christian-Democratic parties. It is thus closely related to and engendered research that addresses the role of social characteristics in shaping voter choices. Given the stability of social characteristics, this research suggests that voting behaviour is rather stable over time.
Moreover, while coalitions between social groupings and political parties are interest-based, this model suggests that voters do not respond strongly to policy issues of the day nor deliver performance evaluations in the polling booth.

In their landmark study “The American Voter”, Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes built on contemporary social psychology to account for voter choice (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; see also Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954). In their model, voter choice is determined by political perceptions and evaluations which in turn are affected by prior experience. Fully understanding the evolution of a person’s voting behavior thus requires studying a host of past events included in the famous notion of a “funnel of causality”. However, it suffices to examine political attitudes at the time of voting to explain voter choice. Campbell et al. identified three proximate motivational factors as particularly important: party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation. They conceptualized party identification as a longstanding psychological attachment to a political party that serves as a perceptual filter and is thus resistant to change, but not completely immutable. While this factor lends stability to attitudes and voting behaviour, issue and candidate orientations explain party changes. In contrast to more sociological accounts, this model is thus better suited to explain both stable and changing voting behaviour. When exploring the 1952 and 1956 US presidential election, the Michigan scholars found that party identification was of pre-eminent importance. Attitudes toward political issues, by contrast, appeared to play a considerably smaller role. Accordingly, voters were not primarily concerned with public policy when casting their votes.

To better understand the role of issue orientations, scholars developed new concepts. Stokes (1963) distinguished between position and valence issues. Accordingly, on valence issues parties compete for electoral support by demonstrating their capability of achieving a goal whose desirability is (virtually) uncontroversial among parties and the electorate. Peace and prosperity are cases in point. Concerning position issues, by contrast, parties differ on
which policy option to pursue so that voters can choose according to which party’s position fits best with their stance. Examples include the issues of whether to close down nuclear power plants and whether to legalize abortion. Following Downs’ notion of spatial party competition, voters were originally assumed to vote for parties whose platforms are close to their ideal policy point when voting on position issues (Downs 1957). It was objected, however, that this proximity calculus was too complicated to describe voters’ decision-making. Instead, Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) argued that voters employ a directional calculus, i.e. they vote for the party which takes (within a reasonable range) their preferred position with greater intensity. Another important distinction refers to the temporal dimension of issue voting. Accordingly, retrospective orientations describe evaluations of past accomplishments, whereas prospective orientations refer to future expectations. The evidence suggests that, irrespective of employing the proximity or the directional model (e.g. Lewis and King 1999; Merrill and Grofman 1999), position issues in general have a smaller impact than valence issues. Moreover, retrospective evaluations appear to be more influential than prospective ones. Taken together, voters appear to hold representatives accountable by rewarding or punishing them for past performance, rather than providing them with mandates for future policy (e.g., Miller and Shanks 1996).

The Michigan model served as some kind of a role model for electoral research in the United States and many other polities (see, e.g., Campbell and Valen 1961; Butler and Stokes 1974; Converse and Pierce 1986). Scholars did not simply apply the model but also put its tenets to test. The evolving debates heavily focused on the notion of party identification. Scholars argued that measures of party identification did not exhibit theoretically desired properties, e.g., over-time stability, in several polities other than the United States (e.g., Thomassen 1976; LeDuc 1981). Over time, revisionist scholars objected that even in the United States partisanship was much more responsive to political experience.
This led Fiorina (1981) to conceive of partisanship as a “running tally”, rather than a stable attachment shaping political perception as proposed by “traditionalists”.

This controversy has not yet come to an end, but is continuing with increasingly sophisticated methods. Scholars maintained that evidence leveled against the traditional concept resulted from methodologically flawed analyses which utilized ill-suited indicators or inadequate statistical methods (e.g., Green, Schickler, and Palmquist 2002). Revisionist scholars, by contrast, claim that even methodologically sound analyses show more over-time variation and responsiveness to short-term factors like leader performance than was compatible with the original conception. Instead of subscribing to the prevalent role of party attachments, they suggest a model of “valence politics” (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, and Whiteley 2004, 2009). By implication, this model suggests a larger role for policy responsiveness in voting behaviour.

In summary, the notion of explaining voter choice in terms of political attitudes now is virtually uncontested. Scholarly controversy focuses primarily on the nature of attitudes that affect voter choice. This debate is quite closely related to the role of public policy attitudes in voting behaviour and thus to the issue of whether elections are instruments that voters utilize to hold politicians accountable in policy terms.

3. Changes in Voting Behaviour?

Aside from conceptual issues, scholars explored the possibility of long-term changes in voting behaviour. Building on the cleavage concept, one line of research addressed the changing role of cleavages and socio-demographic characteristics in shaping vote choice (see, e.g., Franklin 1992; Evans 1999). The debate led to findings that are not easily reconciled. Classical cleavages appear to have declined until the start of the 21st century (Franklin 1992). Yet, socio-demographic characteristics have not ceased to affect voting behaviour (see Manza and Brooks 1999). Evidence even points to newly emerging alignments between social groupings
and political parties (Evans 1999; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, and Frey 2008), although these differ from traditional cleavages (Franklin 2010). Moreover, the explanatory power of socio-demographic characteristics varies across elections and responds to party platforms, suggesting a considerable role for political maneuvering (e.g., Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999; Elff 2009). Taken together, the relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and vote choice appears to be more complex than earlier accounts implied.

In the Michigan framework, scholars demonstrated a decline in the number of partisan identifiers in many Western democracies (e.g., Dalton 1984, 2000). This partisan realignment led to a larger number of voters being responsive to short-term factors and thus potentially volatile. The nature of this process, however, is controversial. In an optimistic interpretation, which builds on the notion of cognitive mobilization, new apartisans resemble closely ideal “rational” voters casting their votes after a thorough and objective analysis of issue positions (see Dalton 1984, 2000). A competing interpretation maintains that partisan independence is not increasingly intertwined with political sophistication, rather the opposite is true. Existing evidence supports the latter, rather than the former, notion (see Albright 2009). Accordingly, partisan realignment is thus not likely to yield an increasingly “rational” electorate.

In a similar vein, the decline of partisan attachments engendered a debate about a “personalization” of voter choice (Mughan 2000). Evidence from diverse countries suggests that attitudes toward candidates’ personalities play a role in affecting voting behaviour, but in many political systems these effects are not overwhelmingly strong. What is more, candidate effects did not steadily increase over time; they rather appear to vary in an election-specific way (e.g., King 2002).

Leaving aside the issues of voter sophistication and personal votes, declining social and political ties imply an increasing number of voters that are “up for grabs” and thus
potentially affected by campaigns. This shift appears to have engendered a renewed interest in the role of campaigns. Utilizing sophisticated techniques of data collection and analysis (e.g., Brady and Johnston 2006), scholars confirmed Lazarsfeld et al.'s finding that electoral campaigns serve as a means to activate deep-seated political predispositions (see Gelman and King 1993; Finkel 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995). At the same time, events, political communication, e.g. televised debates, and campaigning have the potential to arouse the voters’ attention and to increase their probability of turning out and switching parties (e.g., Holbrook 1996; Imai 2005; Gerber and Green 2008). Moreover, some groups of the electorate appear to be particularly susceptible to campaign appeals (e.g., Hillygus and Jackman 2003).

The renewed interest in campaign communications not only added another item to the lengthy list of factors shaping voting behaviour. Rather, it also reminded scholars of the fact that voters do not make up their minds in isolation: they choose from a pre-selected menu of options which are presented to them by political elites employing particular communication strategies. To put it in Key’s (1966, p. 2) famous words:

The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. As candidates and parties clamor for attention and vie for popular support, the people’s verdict can be no more than a selective reflection from among the alternatives and outlooks presented to them.

By taking elites into account, scholars thus might be in a particularly good position to grasp the electoral process as a whole and its implications for the political process.

4. Studying Public Opinion
Survey-based research on public opinion (see Converse 1987) was pioneered by scholars that drew rather discomforting conclusions about the nature of US public opinion. Public opinion on foreign policy was portrayed as fickle and not well founded (Almond 1950). Philip Converse amplified this picture in ground-breaking analyses of political belief-systems in mass publics (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964, 1970, 1975). He showed that many citizens were rather ill-informed about public affairs. Introducing the concept of “levels of conceptualization”, he demonstrated that most US voters did not think about parties in ideological terms. Moreover, survey responses to different policy issues were not strongly associated, suggesting that voters lacked attitudinal structure. The evidence also suggested that in some limiting cases a large number of responses reflected non-attitudes. Put differently, voters appear to lack attitudes and thus construct survey responses on the spot (see Converse 1964, 1970). In a similar vein, Lane (1962) demonstrated that voters were able to make sense of politics by “morselizing” and relying on idiosyncratic perceptions and interpretations.

This portrait of an ill-informed public both lacking attitudinal constraint and being innocent of ideology could hardly be interpreted as salvation of the “rational” voter. Critics called these findings into question, however. At the individual level, scholars objected that the original findings were methodologically flawed (e.g., Achen 1975) and time-bound, i.e., specific to the politically calm 1950s (e.g., Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976). To these assertions responded a host of analyses that demonstrated that the American voter had not significantly changed during the second half of the 20th century in terms of political knowledge, ideological reasoning, attitude structure, and over-time stability in responses to policy issues (e.g., Converse and Markus 1979; Smith 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008). Accordingly, the micro-level attempts at rehabilitating American public opinion hardly succeeded.
Aggregate-level analyses maintained that despite widespread ignorance and lack of constraint at the individual level aggregate-level public opinion turns out to be rational (see Page and Shapiro 1992). This conclusion builds on the observation that public opinion sensibly responds to political events and policy decisions (see also Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002). These accounts, however, rest on strong assumptions that hardly resemble reality. Individual-level ignorance biases policy preferences in a non-random way; so aggregating individual-level preferences does not lead to unbiased collective preferences (Althaus 1998; Gilens 2001; Caplan 2007; Bartels 2008). As a consequence, the “miracle of aggregation” is not likely to occur in real-world settings—be it in the United States or elsewhere.

These findings suggest that citizens form attitudes toward politics and policies, if at all, in a haphazard way. Yet, some scholars perceive a silver lining at the horizon. Accordingly, although voters do not resemble “super-citizens” they possess well-founded and well-organized attitudes in certain respects. Converse (1964) already pointed to the existence of issue publics, i.e. voters who despite general indifference exhibit considerable knowledge and attitudinal constraint on specific policies. In a similar vein, scholars argued that sources, other than abstract ideologies, might lend structure and stability to individual political attitudes and aggregate public opinion, though on a limited scale. To illustrate the argument and its implications, I shall give an overview of research on values, group orientations, and elite cues.4

As values are conceptions of the desirable, they quite naturally suggest themselves as criteria for voters to evaluate policy proposals. In this vein, core political values were demonstrated to affect foreign policy attitudes in the US (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), and attitudes toward regional integration in Europe (Inglehart 1971). Similarly, personal values, as proposed by Schwartz (1992), have an impact on attitudes
toward immigration policies (Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt 2008). As a result, rather stable values appear to shape and lend stability to political attitudes.

The role of group orientations, or collective identities, in shaping political attitudes primarily derives from the possibility to link policy proposals to specific groups. Voters who learn that a policy proposal is likely to benefit an in-group will be eager to approve of this proposal, whereas they will oppose policies beneficial to out-groups (e.g., Brady and Sniderman 1985; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). To give but a few examples for this heuristic strategy, US whites rely on sentiments towards blacks to evaluate certain policies (e.g., Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Kinder and Sanders 1996). In Europe, citizens subscribing to an exclusive national identity are suspicious of transferring policy competencies to the supra-national level and oppose the inclusion of additional countries in the European Union (e.g., Carey 2002; Karp and Bowler 2006). Similarly, both in the United States and in Europe, group sentiments considerably affect attitudes towards immigration policy (see Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Luedtke 2005).

Following the lead of political elites is another heuristic for citizens when evaluating policies. An obvious case in point are political parties and political leaders signaling their positions on policy issues to their supporters who are likely to accept these cues (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, pp. 185-186). In this vein, it has been demonstrated that partisan cue taking plays a considerable role in attitude formation on European integration (e.g., Ray 2003). More generally, party competition has been identified as a factor that helps citizens to form well-organized political attitudes (Sniderman and Bullock 2004). Elite signals are thus a potential source of public attitudes toward policies.

At first glance, the findings on the role of rather stable predispositions in affecting political attitudes might be read as implying that voters possess stable and well-organized policy attitudes. A closer look reveals, however, that the ground is shakier than it seems. Any given policy issue can be linked to a multitude of predispositions, including various
conflicting values, multiple group ties, and diverse elite cues (see Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, and Tetlock 1996; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). How many and which of them will actually be linked to an issue in the voter’s mind is conditional on both voter and contextual characteristics, including voter’s political sophistication, elite messages, and media content.

This conclusion derives primarily from numerous studies on priming and framing effects. Studies on priming demonstrated that by highlighting or downplaying arguments or information in political communication elites and the media can alter the ingredients of public evaluations of policies, politicians and parties (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Framing analyses aim at examining the effects of elite and media strategies of (deliberately) putting public policy issues into specific interpretative frames. For example, supporters of non-smoking policies present them as means to health protection, while opponents refer to them as an illegitimate government intervention. Heavily relying on experimental designs, research demonstrated that receiving specific interpretative frames affects evaluations of policy proposals as well as the sources of policy evaluations (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007). While the evidence demonstrates that elites and the media have an impact on citizens’ attitudes it does not suggest that they are capable of discretionarily manipulating public opinion. Rather, factors like elite conflict, source credibility, and personal communication constrain elites in shaping public opinion and citizen characteristics condition the susceptibility to elite influence (see Druckman 2001, 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007).

The insight into the conditionality of the sources of political attitudes at the individual level has at least three noteworthy implications. First, political elites and the media do not only affect the determinants of vote choice, as evinced in campaign studies, but also affect the sources of policy evaluations and thus these evaluations themselves. To grasp the nature of public opinion therefore requires taking elites and the media into account. Second, at
any given point in time, voters may differ in the predispositions they refer to when forming policy attitudes. This conclusion reminds us of the heterogeneity of the electorate. Finally, the argument implies that a given voter may refer to different predispositions at different points in time. So the voter might take different positions on a policy issue. As a result, the role of (domain-specific) predispositions in shaping political evaluations does not guarantee that evaluations themselves exhibit a great deal of over-time stability and organization.

The main thrust of the above evidence is captured nicely by John Zaller’s (1992) often-cited model of opinion formation. This model assumes that voters do not harbour crystallized attitudes toward political objects, but considerations, i.e. reasons suggesting approval of one side on a policy issue they received and accepted from elite communication. Due to a lack of political knowledge, many citizens possess opposing considerations on most issues and are thus ambivalent. When asked to utter an evaluation of a political object, be it in everyday conversation or in a survey, citizens average across the considerations that are accessible, or “top of the head”, at the moment. Put differently, all respondents alike construe survey responses on the spot. Accessibility of considerations depends, inter alia, upon whether they were recently called into memory or were thought about. Finally, citizens differ in political awareness and these differences in habitual engagement with political information account for differences in stability and organization of survey responses. This parsimonious model is capable of elegantly explaining a host of phenomena, including response instability, the dynamics of public opinion and the role of mass media and political elites therein. In summary, this model is, as of today, the most comprehensive and promising attempt to come to grips with the complexities of public opinion.

5. New Directions and Future Challenges
In substantive terms, the above overview of previous research suggests two directions for future research. To begin with, scholars should make great efforts to better understand the causal mechanisms that lead to statistical associations between, e.g., policy attitudes and vote choice as observed in surveys. Opening up the black box of political information-processing would contribute to building more satisfactory explanations of the process of political reasoning and decision-making at the micro level that includes the interplay of information, affect, and emotions. In this vein, experimental studies demonstrated in recent years that prior affect has an impact on exposure, reception, and processing of political information (see Taber and Lodge 2006; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Furthermore, experiments with the dynamic information board revealed important insights into strategies voters employ to search for and process information when making up their mind (see Lau and Redlawsk 2006). Focusing on these processes might also shed light on the role of specific emotions in forming political attitudes and making decisions (e.g., Marcus, Neumann, and MacKuen 2000; Brader 2006). Similarly, research might also yield substantive findings on the role and dynamics of personality in political reasoning (e.g., Schoen and Schumann 2007; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha 2010; Mondak 2010).

Research on psychological micro-level processes reveals how citizens form opinions and decide, given specific conditions. This is necessary, but not sufficient for grasping the nature and dynamics of public opinion and voting behaviour in real world politics, however. In real world politics, macro-level factors, including institutional settings, media content, elite strategies, and culture, are variable, rather than constant. As these factors affect micro-level processes, ignoring them would lead to scholarship that falls short of Key’s (1966: 2) insight that “the voice of the people is but an echo”. Taken together, this line of reasoning suggests that future research should direct its attention both to the micro and the macro level.

In terms of methodology, research on public opinion and voting behaviour is primarily survey research. The validity of its results therefore is subject to the same
methodological limitations as other survey-based research. For several years the landscape of survey research has begun to change. Gathering data from random samples appears to become more difficult using traditional techniques as face-to-face and telephone interviews. In addition, web-based interviews have become increasingly popular though their methodological quality has not yet been fully examined (e.g., Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2009). It is thus warranted to deliberately utilize survey techniques and to carefully study substantive implications of survey methodology. For a couple of years, in addition, scholars have increasingly utilized data from experiments. This research design, well-known from survey experiments, is well-suited to test causal effects. Yet, drawing valid inferences from experiments requires carefully taking into account to what extent specifics of the experimental setting allow generalizations (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). Experimental designs are potentially very promising but require deliberate application and interpretation.

6. Conclusion

Democratic theory puts emphasis on the preeminent role of citizen preferences in guiding public policies. Scholars in public opinion and voting behaviour explore, inter alia, citizens’ attitudes toward policies and their impact on vote choice. The evidence suggests that attitudes toward public policies are not particularly powerful in shaping electoral decision making. For many voters, deep-seated predispositions appear to be of primary importance. Moreover, the role of policy attitudes is conditional on various factors, including campaign communication. Scholarship on political attitudes and public opinion demonstrated that citizens’ attitudes do not resemble the textbook notion of policy preferences. Rather, political attitudes, as measured by survey responses, turn out to be variable and conditional on a multitude of contextual factors. In particular, responses to survey questions concerning public policies depend on elite messages.
Taken together, these findings suggest that a smoothly working democracy cannot be taken for granted. Crucially, the impact of politicians on voters’ attitudes and voting behaviour and voters’ perceptual biases (e.g., Caplan 2007) raise the issue of whether citizens are able to really control politicians. By implication, democracy may be considered doomed. Yet, this conclusion might be somewhat too pessimistic. As long as competing elites aim at influencing citizens and elite competition is not permanently lopsided, democratic control of public policy appears to be possible (see Bartels 2003). But this endeavour is much more challenging than civic textbooks suggest.

Bibliography


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Since a couple of years, this line of reasoning has regained influence in research on the role of social networks in shaping political attitudes and electoral behaviour (see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).

Comparative analyses explored the role of social and political context as well as institutional setting in affecting the determinants of vote choice (see, e.g., Granberg and Holmberg 1988).

Material self-interest is another potential source of attitudes that often turns out to be less powerful than one might expect (see overviews Kinder 1998; Taber 2003).

Party attachments can be conceived of as a special case of collective identity (Greene 1999), so that there is a conceptual overlap.