Two indicators, one conclusion: On the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany before and after re-unification

Harald Schoen

Introduction

In 1990, through re-unification, Germany regained full sovereignty and expanded, in principle, her leeway in foreign policy-making (e.g., Arnold 1991). In fact, German foreign policy did not undergo a fundamental change after unification. Germany is still member of the NATO and of the EU, and she has not changed her relations to many other countries. Her principal aims in foreign policy also appear not to have undergone a dramatic change (e.g., Harnisch and Maull 2001; Rittberger and Wagner 2001; Meiers 2002; but see Forsberg 2005; Crawford 2007). Still, the means of German foreign policy have undisputedly changed since unification. While German troops were not sent abroad for military missions before unification, the Bundeswehr has participated in several international, both peace-keeping and peace-enforcing, missions since 1990 (e.g., von Bredow 2008: 231-247). Thus, by relaxing this constraint on foreign policy, the use of military force ceased to be a non-issue in German politics and provided Germany with greater political discretion.

Given a larger leeway, the factors driving foreign policy-making become potentially more consequential. Besides external and other internal factors, public opinion has been shown to be influential in shaping foreign policy decision-making in various political systems, including Germany (Page and Shapiro 1992; Brettschneider 1996; LaBalme 2000; Sobel 2001). Accordingly, post-unification changes in German foreign policy have increased the potential of public opinion to be pivotal in foreign policy decisions. Provided German citizens perceived their increased potential to affect foreign and security policy decisions, it might be
hypothesized that they increasingly paid attention to foreign affairs and security issues. Put differently, re-unification might have increased the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany.

The remainder of this chapter aims at examining this hypothesis. The next section will outline the theoretical framework for the analysis and discuss two indicators of public salience. After a description of the data and methodology, the analysis demonstrates that the hypothesis is not borne out by the data, irrespective of which indicator is employed. At the same time, the indicators lead to considerably different conclusions on the over-time variation of the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and discusses further implications.

Theoretical Framework

In modern representative democracy the interplay of voters and elites is expected to guarantee that public policies are in line with popular preferences over policies. Political representation comprises two corresponding processes (Pitkin 1967; Herzog 1989): Political elites should be responsive to policy preferences of the electorate. Elite responsiveness is, however, not the only means to attain political representation. Political elites might persuade voters that the policies they pursue are reasonable. Provided this dual process of political representation that includes elite responsiveness and political leadership works smoothly, public policies will correspond to popular preferences over policies.

Though political representation is a key feature of democracy, it cannot be taken for granted that this process works smoothly. Focusing on elite responsiveness, political leaders are not necessarily eager to be responsive to public opinion when making policy decisions. Rather, they will only be inclined to be responsive if they have an incentive to act in accordance with popular preferences. Prior research suggests that issue-specific public attention is conducive
to elite responsiveness in policy-making in various policy domains including foreign affairs (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Hill and Hurley 1999). Given this empirical relationship, citizens aiming at influencing foreign policy decision-making have an incentive to direct their attention to foreign affairs.

Previous research also demonstrated that the public responds quite sensibly to political events as well as to policy decisions in the foreign policy realm. This has been verified for the United States, Canada, Germany and several other European nations (e.g., Wlezien 1995, 1996; Isernia et al. 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2004). The findings suggest, for example, that the German public responded reasonably both to the Suez crisis in the 1950s and to the political events following NATO’s double-track decision in the 1980s (Isernia et al. 2002). Provided reasonable responses to political events, the German public also might have learned that unification expanded Germany’s leeway in foreign policy-making because, first and foremost, she no longer categorically ruled out deploying troops for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions (e.g., von Bredow 2008). The expanded leeway in turn might have signalled to the citizens that foreign affairs warrant closer attention. As a result, the German public might be expected to have increasingly directed its attention to foreign affairs after re-unification in 1990.

Addressing this hypothesis on the over-time variation of the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany requires a proper indicator. According to a rich literature, it is appropriate to utilize data from surveys that ask respondents to indicate which issues they consider important (e.g., Burden and Sanberg 2003; Binzer Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Oppermann and Viehrig 2009; Viehrig 2010). Though widely used, the so-called “most important problem” question appears to suffer from several limitations. For one thing, this indicator confuses “issues” and (negatively valenced) “problems” (Wlezien 2005). For another thing, it cannot be taken for granted that voters mentioning “foreign affairs” as an important problem hold cognitively founded attitudes toward this policy domain that are capable of affecting
political judgment and political behavior (Niemi and Bartels 1985; Johns 2010). Rather, voters’ attention might follow the media agenda without having considerable cognitive underpinnings. If self-reported issue salience does not signal to elites that a lack of policy responsiveness will lead to declining popularity or electoral defeat, however, it will not provide elites with a strong incentive to be responsive. Given the peculiarities of the policy domain, this objection might be particularly well-taken when it comes to public opinion on foreign affairs (e.g., Almond 1950). Therefore, it is reasonable to consider an alternative indicator of public salience.

Assuming that elites are likely to respond to public opinion when a lack of responsiveness will hurt their popularity or will result in electoral defeat, the electoral impact of issue-specific attitudes suggests itself as a proper indicator of public salience (see e.g., Aldrich et al. 1989). If foreign policy attitudes affect vote choice, elites taking an unpopular position or exhibiting a lack of competence in this policy domain will be punished by voters. By the same token, candidates and parties pursuing popular policies and demonstrating their domain-specific competence will be rewarded at the polls. Therefore, the impact of foreign policy attitudes on vote choice appears to be a reasonable indicator to measure incentives to elite responsiveness in the foreign policy domain.

As a result, this analysis employs two different indicators to explore the hypothesis that the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany increased after unification. On the one hand, it utilizes the “most important problem” question. Despite its well-known limitations, this indicator has already been employed to measure the public salience of foreign policy in Germany (e.g., Rattinger and Heinlein 1986; Oppermann and Viehrig 2009; Viehrig 2010). None of these analyses covers an interval that allows to examine the substantive hypothesis of this chapter. On the other hand, the present analysis employs the effect of foreign policy attitudes on vote choice as an indicator of public salience. Previous studies of German federal elections addressed the role of foreign policy attitudes in affecting vote choice. However, they
differ, quite naturally, in substantive focus and research design. To give an example in terms of methodology: some studies employed normal vote analysis (Falter and Rattinger 1983, 1986), some discriminant analysis (Roller 1994), some OLS regression (Klingemann 1977; Schmitt 1998), while others utilized logistic regression (Fuchs and Rohrschneider 2005; Schoen 2004, 2008). So their results are not easily comparable and do not allow for exploring long-term trends.

This analysis thus serves a dual purpose: In substantive terms, it explores the question whether re-unification was conducive to an increase in the public salience of foreign affairs in Germany. In terms of methodology, it examines whether two indicators of public salience yield similar results. Building on the above discussion, the two measures are anticipated to lead to different substantive conclusions.

Data and Methods

To address the public salience of foreign policy in Germany before and after unification, this analysis utilizes survey data collected during the 1972 to 2005 German federal elections. It employs two indicators of public salience. For one thing, it utilizes information gleaned from voters’ responses to the “most important problem” question. For another thing, it analyzes the role of foreign policy attitudes in shaping vote choice in order to capture the behavioral consequences of foreign policy orientations.

As refers to voters’ self-reports, the analysis draws on data from, if possible, pre-election surveys of random samples drawn from the German electorate. Respondents were interviewed using (computer-assisted) personal interviews. In case of data collection in panel surveys, the analysis utilizes data from the last pre-election panel wave. As additional analyses demonstrated here, this is the most appropriate solution, given the trade-off between selective panel attrition and temporal proximity to the election. Respondents were asked for the
(second) most important problem facing the country using open-ended questions. Responses concerning foreign policy, external security, (dis-)armament, international relations, peace and the like were coded ‘1’ while the remaining responses were coded ‘0’. Then the proportion of the former responses was estimated.

The second part of the analysis addresses the role of foreign policy attitudes in shaping vote choice in the ten elections under scrutiny. The long-term comparative focus of this analysis requires a parallel design for the ten single-election analyses in the 1972 to 2005 period.\textsuperscript{3} Vote choice will be captured by two indicators. One dummy variable indicates whether a person cast a vote for the governing party or not (vote for a different party, abstain or ‘don’t know’). The other dummy variable captures in an analogous way whether a respondent voted for one of the opposition parties that aimed at forming government after the election or not.\textsuperscript{4} By including abstainers and undecided voters, the analysis allows for exploring the role of foreign policy attitudes in vote choice and electoral mobilization. Focusing on governing and opposition parties precludes analyzing all nuances of vote choice, but addresses the main dimension of electoral competition. Moreover, it is helpful in addressing the question whether the electoral salience of foreign policy attitudes differs between governing and opposition parties. It might be speculated that these attitudes are more influential in affecting voting behavior for governing parties, since foreign affairs often seem to be a natural domain of government (e.g., van der Eijk and Franklin 2007).

The predictor variables include party identification, candidate preference, domestic and foreign policy attitudes. Employing the standard indicator,\textsuperscript{5} party identification was measured by dummy variables indicating whether respondents identified with a government (opposition) party. Similarly, dummy variables were created to capture whether interviewees preferred the candidate for chancellor nominated by government (opposition) parties. Issue attitudes were measured using information gleaned from responses to questions that aimed at tapping the parties’ perceived competences in successfully tackling political problems. In
other words, the valence, rather than the position, model of issue voting was employed. For each issue, we created dummy variables indicating whether a respondent deemed a government (opposition) party capable of successfully tackling the problem. This information was then utilized to create count variables for the domestic and the foreign policy domain capturing on how many issues a respondent believed a government (opposition) party was competent. In as many cases as possible, the domestic count variables included as many policies as their foreign policy counterparts. In years with just a single foreign policy indicator in the survey, there are more domestic dimensions than foreign dimensions included.

Given the binary nature of the dependent variables, logistic regressions were run to estimate the effects of the various predictor variables. To gauge the impact of foreign policy attitudes, two kinds of indicators were used. For one thing, the logistic regression coefficients provide useful information about the impact of foreign policy attitudes on vote choice. For another thing, from these coefficients we calculated changes in the predicted probabilities of casting a vote for the respective parties that resulted when moving from the minimum to the maximum on the foreign policy competence scale. Domestic policy competence was set to its mean, whereas the dummy variables for party identification and candidate preference were set to 0 or 1. In effect, changes in predicted probabilities were calculated within four subsections of the electorate. In analyses of vote choice for government parties, these groups comprise identifiers of government parties who prefer these parties’ candidate for chancellor, voters identifying with a governing party but not preferring the respective candidate, voters who do not identify with a government party but prefer the government parties’ candidate, and, finally, respondents who neither identify with a government party nor prefer the respective candidate. In analyses of voting for opposition parties, the groups are formed analogously. Taken together, these results allow us to examine the impact of foreign policy attitudes on vote choice in the 1972-2005 German federal elections.
Findings

The first indicator of public salience of foreign policy issues is voters’ self-reports of the most important problems facing the country. The results of this analysis are reported in Figure 1. To large majorities of the German electorate, foreign affairs and external security were neither the most nor the second most important problem facing Germany throughout the 1972-2005 period. Moreover, when respondents referred to problems from this policy domain, they preferred to rank them as the second most, rather than as the most, important problem. This pattern is particularly pronounced in the 1990 election, in which the imminent war at the Gulf boosted the proportion of respondents mentioning foreign policy issues as the second most important problem. These findings lend considerable support to the conclusion that foreign affairs and defence were not of overriding importance to the German electorate.

At the same time, the evidence suggests that German re-unification marks some kind of fundamental change. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, some five to fifteen percent of the West German electorate mentioned foreign affairs or security issues as the most or second most important problem facing the country. In the elections from 1994 to 2005, by contrast, foreign or security policy issues were mentioned as the most or second most important problem by not more than and three percent of the respondents, respectively. As additional information demonstrate, these findings apply to East and West Germans, with the latter being somewhat more inclined to list foreign policy problems. The only exception is the 2002 election, in which more East than West Germans mentioned problems from the foreign policy domain as being most important.

- Insert Figure 1 about here -
The evidence clearly refutes the substantive hypothesis and bears some irony. Remember that German unification implied that Germany regained sovereignty and expanded her leeway in foreign policy, giving public opinion a larger potential to affect foreign policy decisions. The findings suggest, however, that public opinion did not respond to this change in structural conditions by being more attentive to foreign and security policy. Rather, public concern with foreign policy after unification as compared to the pre-unification period diminished. Only in 2002 and 2005, public salience appeared to increase marginally.

The decrease in public attention, to some extent, is likely to be a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war and German unification. For one thing, after reunification there were no longer two German states, so that respondents could not mention “inner-German relations” as (second) most important problem. As only a small number of pre-unification responses refer to this issue, this argument accounts for only a small portion of the actual decline in public attention, however. For another thing, during the cold war period Germany was a focus of the East-West conflict, so that many events in international politics had a more or less direct bearing on Germany. After the end of the cold war, international politics is no longer as closely intertwined with the German domestic arena and Germans’ feeling of personal security as prior to 1990.

Looked at from a methodological angle, however, the findings might tell a somewhat different story. Respondents were asked for the most important problem “in this country”. In the cold war era, to many respondents this question might have tapped problems that qualify as “foreign policy” because the East-West conflict and military threat affected life in Germany. After the end of the cold war, though, people might consider foreign affairs, e.g., international conflicts and Germany’s response to them, important but they might interpret the survey item as not tapping this kind of problems. Accordingly, the decline in the number of respondents mentioning foreign policy after the end of the cold war might, to some extent, reflect a methodological artefact.
Irrespective of these methodological issues, voters’ self-reports of foreign policy issue salience might not provide signals that give political elites strong incentives to be responsive to public opinion on foreign policy issues. Foreign policy issue-voting is more likely to foster elite responsiveness. We thus examined the role of foreign policy attitudes in shaping vote choice for government and opposition parties in the 1972-2005 German federal elections, using logistic regression models in which party identification, candidate preference and domestic policy issues were controlled for. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 1 and 2. To make the results more accessible, we calculated changes in predicted probabilities of casting a vote for government or opposition parties from logistic regression coefficients that passed conventional levels of statistical significance. These results are reported in Table 3.

The results demonstrate that party identification, candidate preference and attitudes toward domestic policy issues exhibited statistically significant and sizable effects on voting behavior in the ten federal elections. The findings on foreign policy attitudes are somewhat more mixed, however. Several coefficients on the foreign policy predictors do not pass conventional levels of statistical significance. This pattern suggests that it cannot be taken for granted that foreign policy attitudes play a role affecting vote choice in Germany. Domestic issues, by contrast, continuously exhibited considerable effects. In this respect, the analysis lends credence to the traditional view that foreign policy issues are, by default, electorally less important than domestic issues.

A closer look at the results reveals considerable over-time variation in the effect of foreign policy attitudes on individual voting behavior. In 1972, the foreign policy coefficient in the government analysis attains statistical significance. As the predicted probabilities in Table 3
indicate, among those voters who preferred Willy Brandt as chancellor, favorable attitudes toward the government’s foreign policy considerably increased the probability of casting a vote for the government parties. These findings might reflect the public debates about the ‘Ostpolitik’ that preceded the premature dissolution of parliament in 1972. In 1976, however, foreign policy did not play any role in vote choice.

The 1980 and 1983 elections, by contrast, serve as some kind of epitome of foreign policy influence on vote choice. In 1980, individual voting behavior for government parties was affected by foreign policy attitudes. Accordingly, voters deeming the government parties competent in the foreign policy domain were disproportionately likely to cast a vote for either government party. In 1983, attitudes toward foreign policy exhibited considerable effects on vote choice for both government and opposition parties, with the impact on the latter being somewhat larger. Moreover, additional analyses underscore the impact of foreign policy attitudes by demonstrating that these attitudes increased the aggregate vote share of government parties in 1980 and of opposition parties in 1983. Given the events in international politics – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the NATO double-track decision – and the campaign communications – e.g., the “Raketenwahlkampf” in 1983 – in this period, these findings come as no surprise.

In the four subsequent elections, foreign policy attitudes played a considerably smaller role, if any. To be sure, both in the 1987 and 1990 analyses, only one coefficient on foreign policy attitudes passes conventional levels of statistical significance. But the predicted probabilities in Table 3 indicate that substantive effects are confined to one subsection of the electorate. In the 1987 analysis, opposition parties’ perceived competence in the foreign policy domain made a difference among voters who did not identify with an opposition party but preferred chancellor Kohl’s challenger. Likewise, in 1990 favorable evaluations of governing parties’ competence in this domain increased the likelihood of casting a vote for a government party among voters who preferred chancellor Kohl over his challenger while not identifying with
either governing party. Foreign policy problems ceased to play a role in the 1994 election, however. This conclusion also holds for the 1998 election since the significant coefficient in the government equation does not result in substantive effects on the probability of casting a vote for government or opposition parties.

After the turn to the 21st century, foreign policy returned as a relevant force in electoral behavior. Although vote choice for opposition parties was not affected by foreign policy attitudes, they made a considerable difference in the voters’ calculus when deciding upon choosing a government party in the 2002 and 2005 elections. In particular, citizens who preferred Gerhard Schröder as chancellor were inclined to respond to foreign policy attitudes in their vote choice. What is more, foreign policy preferences considerably increased the aggregate vote share of the red-green government parties.9

Thus, the evidence gleaned from the analyses of vote choice does not confirm the hypothesis that the public salience of foreign affairs rose after unification. To be sure, the results indicate a slight increase in the 1994-2005 period that might reflect the gradual shift in Germany’s foreign policy leeway. But this rise is neither particularly impressive nor does it lead to effects on vote choice that equal the electoral impact of foreign policy attitudes in the 1980s. In long-term perspective, public salience for foreign affairs did not increase.

As concerns the methodological issue, this indicator of foreign policy salience obviously yields a different pattern of over-time variation than voters’ self-reports. To be sure, both analyses confirm that foreign policy was comparatively salient in 1980. But the findings in the remaining elections differ considerably across indicators. Whereas voters’ self-reports suggest that German unification marked some kind of a watershed in the public salience of foreign policy, the electoral salience of this issue domain varies more in an election-specific way. Thus, both indicators appear to tap different aspects of reality and should therefore not be used interchangeably.
The results on electoral salience suggest that foreign policy attitudes are more powerful in shaping voting behavior for government parties than voting for opposition parties. Whereas seven out of ten coefficients on foreign policy attitudes in government equations attain statistical significance, only three foreign policy coefficients pass conventional levels of significance in the opposition analyses. By and large, foreign policy attitudes appear to affect opposition votes only if they also shape government votes, but in many instances they exhibit only effects on the latter. The data at hand do not allow to determine the sources of this asymmetry. It might be speculated that it results from the fact that foreign policy is some kind of *domaine réservé* of governments. Moreover, processes of political communication and patterns of political perception might also be conducive to it.

Discussion and conclusion

This contribution addressed the public salience of foreign policy issues in German federal elections in the period from 1972 to 2005. To this end, it employed two indicators that yielded quite different results. Voters’ self-reports suggested that foreign policy issues ceased to be publicly salient after German re-unification. By contrast, the electoral salience of foreign policy attitudes varied more in an election-specific fashion. It is thus safe to conclude that the two indicators capture different phenomena and must not be regarded as equivalent. Accordingly, choosing indicators in analyses of public salience requires careful reasoning. In substantive terms, both methodological approaches lend support to the same conclusions: German re-unification did not increase the public salience of foreign policy issues. The evidence suggests that the German public did not respond to the incentives provided by the expanded leeway in foreign policy decision-making. The data thus refute the respective hypothesis. It might be argued that the hypothesis was not well-considered in the first place, because Germany’s leeway in foreign policy expanded gradually rather than abruptly. Even
the expectation that public salience will rise gradually, however, is not clearly borne out by the evidence. Therefore, the results suggest that voters’ attention does not respond to incentives provided by structural factors. Rather, it might be responsive to cues given by the media and political elites, so that “the voice of the people is but an echo” (Key 1966: 2). While this argument might be helpful in resolving the puzzle presented by the evidence it has also a downside. It implies that public salience does not only provide political elites with incentives to be responsive to public opinion, but that it is also shaped by political elites. By downplaying rather than highlighting foreign affairs, political leaders might therefore decrease public attention. This does not suggest discarding public salience as an indicator of incentives to political elites. It rather implies that it is warranted to address elite behavior in analyses of public salience in order to preclude premature conclusions. While this approach is clearly beyond the scope of this analysis, it should be adopted by future research.

The present chapter also has further limitations. Its analyses of voting behavior employed quite simple summary indicators that do not allow for addressing the impact of specific policy issues. Moreover, it includes only indicators suitable to tap the valence model of issue voting but it does not comprise position issues. Though the latter are, by and large, less influential in affecting vote choice than the former, position issues might have made a difference in specific instances. Furthermore, the analysis has only addressed the direct effects of foreign policy attitudes on vote choice but not the indirect ones. To give but an example, attitudes toward the ‘Ostpolitik’ are likely to have shaped attitudes toward Chancellor Brandt before the 1972 election that in turn made a considerable difference in vote choice (see Garding 1978; Kühler 1994). Since these indirect effects are beyond the scope of this analysis, it has probably underestimated the role of foreign policy attitudes on vote choice. Even worse, it might be speculated that the resulting bias is not constant across the ten elections covered in this analysis – and might thus have distorted the findings on the long-term comparison. This issue
as well as the problems noted above should be addressed in future research to better understand the public salience of foreign affairs and its sources.
References


Figure 1: Foreign affairs and security as (second) most important problems in Germany, 1972-2005 (per cent)

From 1972 to 1990, the results are gleaned from West German data; the 1994-2005 results are based on surveys of West and East Germans.
Table 1: Effects of party identification, candidate preference, domestic and foreign policy attitudes on voting behavior for governing parties in German federal elections, 1972-2005 (logistic regressions)

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Entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. From 1972 to 1990, the results are gleaned from West German data; the 1994-2005 results are based on surveys of West and East Germans.
Table 2: Effects of party identification, candidate preference, domestic and foreign policy attitudes on voting behavior for opposition parties in German federal elections, 1972-2005 (logistic regressions)

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<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic policy</td>
<td>2.90**</td>
<td>1.48**</td>
<td>2.62**</td>
<td>2.48**</td>
<td>1.49*</td>
<td>2.60**</td>
<td>1.89**</td>
<td>2.50**</td>
<td>3.67**</td>
<td>3.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.97*</td>
<td>1.98**</td>
<td>1.36**</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2LL₀</td>
<td>2007.1</td>
<td>2094.2</td>
<td>1913.8</td>
<td>1592.4</td>
<td>2136.9</td>
<td>2000.8</td>
<td>2917.2</td>
<td>1694.7</td>
<td>2358.5</td>
<td>1353.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.603</td>
<td>1.529</td>
<td>1.518</td>
<td>1.164</td>
<td>1.544</td>
<td>1.442</td>
<td>2.173</td>
<td>1.988</td>
<td>1.783</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. From 1972 to 1990, the results are gleaned from West German data; the 1994-2005 results are based on surveys of West and East Germans.
Table 3: Changes in probabilities of casting a vote for governing or opposition parties in the 1972-2005 German federal elections (percentage points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not ID, not preferred candidate</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.4*</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>10.7*</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ID, preferred candidate</td>
<td>24.4*</td>
<td>34.2*</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>33.9*</td>
<td>45.2*</td>
<td>29.1*</td>
<td>27.1*</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>22.8*</td>
<td>20.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID, not preferred candidate</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>34.6*</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>44.6*</td>
<td>45.8*</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID, preferred candidate</td>
<td>6.9*</td>
<td>13.6*</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.2*</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>17.0*</td>
<td>21.8*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are changes in predicted probabilities of casting a vote for government/opposition parties when moving from the minimum of the foreign policy scale to its maximum. Party identification and candidate preferences were set to the value indicated in the left-hand column, whereas domestic policy attitudes were set to their mean. These calculations are based on the results reported in Table 2 and 3. ‘ID’ indicates that respondents identified with government/opposition parties; ‘not ID’ indicates that respondents did not identify with any party or identified with a party other than the government/opposition parties under scrutiny in the respective analysis. * The increase in the probability is significant (at least) at the five per cent level.
I am grateful to Philipp Runge and Alexander Schad for their excellent research assistance.

The data sets used in this section of the analysis are available at the GESIS Data Archive under the following numbers: 0635 (1972), 1397 (1976), 1053 (1980), 1537 (1987), 1919 (1990), 3065 (1994), 3066 (1998), 3861 (2002), 4332 (2005). Unfortunately, no adequate data are available for the 1983 election. As no pre-election face-to-face survey was conducted in 2005, the analysis utilizes data from a CAPI post-election survey. In the post-1990 surveys, appropriate weighting factors were applied that ensure proportional representation of East and West Germans according to their share in the German population. Neither the various primary researchers nor GESIS are responsible for analysis and interpretation of the data in this paper.

The data sets used in this section of the analysis are available at the GESIS Data Archive under the following numbers: 0635 (1972), 0823 (1976), 1053 (1980), 1276 (1983), 1537 (1987), 1919 (1990), 2546 (West)/2559 (East) (1994), 3161 (1998), 3849 (West)/3850 (East) (2002), 4397 (2005). In the 1972 to 1990 period, data were collected from random samples of Germans eligible to vote using face-to-face interviews; from 1994 onward, telephone interviews were conducted. If respondents were surveyed in a panel or trend design, the analysis utilizes the data from the panel wave prior to the election. In the post-1990 surveys, appropriate weighting factors were applied that ensure proportional representation of East and West Germans according to their share in the German population.


The survey item reads as follows: „Viele Leute in Deutschland neigen längere Zeit einer bestimmten Partei zu, obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Neigen Sie, ganz allgemein gesprochen, einer bestimmten Partei zu? Wenn ja, welcher?“

When creating the issue indicators the following policies were included: 1972: inflation, education, taxes, pensions, health care (domestic); relations to the East, relations to the USA, relations to China, military security, protection against terrorism from abroad (foreign); 1976: unemployment, inflation (domestic); relations to the East, relations to the USA (foreign); 1980: inflation, taxes, corruption, pensions (domestic); relations to USA, USSR, and GDR; protection against Soviet aggression (foreign); 1983: inflation, unemployment, debt, law and order (domestic); relations to USA, USSR, inhibit the deployment of Pershing II (foreign); 1987: unemployment, economy, debt, pensions, environment (domestic); relations to USA, USSR, GDR, European integration,
disarmament (foreign); 1990: economy, pensions, standard of living in East Germany (domestic); relations USA, USSR, Eastern Europe (foreign); 1994: economy, housing, asylum seekers (domestic); foreign affairs (foreign); 1998: unemployment, finance, pensions (domestic); foreign affairs (foreign); 2002: economy, unemployment, family, foreigners (domestic); foreign affairs (foreign); 2005: economy, unemployment, taxes, education (domestic); foreign affairs (foreign).

7 The variables were rescaled to run from 0 to 1. Additional analyses confirmed that the substantive findings do not critically depend upon the number and nature of issue variables included.

9 By and large, the findings on foreign policy effects in the 1994-2005 federal elections do not differ substantively between East and West Germany.