

Old Friends in Troubled Waters: Policy Principles, Elites, and U.S.-German Relations at the Citizen Level after the Cold War

Hans Rattinger, Harald Schoen, Fabian Endres, Sebastian Jungkunz, Matthias Mader, and Jana Pöttschke

Pre-publication draft; for citation, please refer to the published version.

Foreword

This book is one of the outcomes of a research project on “Attitudes on Foreign and Security Policy in the U.S. and Germany: A Comparison at the Mass and Elite Level” funded by the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG) and directed by the first two authors at their respective universities (Bamberg and Mannheim) from 2010 to 2015. For both of them this project continued strong professional interest in and extensive publication activities about the general topic of public attitudes on foreign policy and national security matters. For the first author this dates way back to the aftermath of the NATO dual-track decision of 1979, and for the second author to the early years of this millennium. Apart from a series of scholarly articles this book is the main scientific product of this project.

When the second author also moved to Mannheim in 2014 the project was united there under one roof. The division of labor between the first and second author and their assistants and collaborators was largely defined by the Atlantic, with the former being in charge of the collection and analyses of U.S. data and the latter one for those for Germany. The remaining four authors for more or less extended periods of time were the primary project researchers, Sebastian Jungkunz and Matthias Mader with the second, and Fabian Endres and Jana Pöttschke with the first author.

Apart from the authors a number of institutions and individuals have contributed to the completion of this study. Our gratitude goes, first of all, to the DFG and its various representatives we had the pleasure of working with for generous support (including the publication of this volume) and efficient and pleasant cooperation. The Mannheim Center for European Social Research has competently as always hosted the project at our university. And, finally, Philipp Runge and Corina Wagner as research associates as well as a large number of student research assistants have worked within the project over the years: Sören Alvermann, Vivienne Brando, Luisa Fabing, Torben Festerling, Aitana Gräbs, Theron Delano

Hall, Heiner Heiland, Hannes Jarisch, Johannes Kiefl, Luca Meister, Anna Meyer, Daniel Nürnberger, Helga Nützel, Louisa Plasberg, Julia Semmelbeck, Emma Steen, Anne-Christin Sutterer, Alena Unverdorben, and Natalia Yugay. They all deserve our thanks.

Mannheim, January 2016

Hans Rattinger

Harald Schoen

Fabian Endres

Sebastian Jungkunz

Matthias Mader

Jana Pöttschke

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| List of Figures | 5 |
| List of Tables | 6 |
| List of Abbreviations | 7 |
| 1 Introduction | 8 |
| 1.1 U.S.-German relations in the post-Cold War era from a citizen perspective | 8 |
| 1.2 Core postures, parties, and U.S.-German relations: A model and some expectations | 11 |
| 1.3 Description of the data and outline of the book | 32 |
| 2 Change and stability of U.S. and German foreign and security policy attitudes | 36 |
| 2.1 Introduction | 36 |
| 2.2 Foreign policy postures | 38 |
| 2.2.1 Introduction | 38 |
| 2.2.2 Internationalism | 39 |
| 2.2.3 Militarism | 42 |
| 2.2.4 Multilateralism | 48 |
| 2.3 Perceptions of the international system | 53 |
| 2.3.1 Introduction | 53 |
| 2.3.2 Foreign policy problems facing the country | 55 |
| 2.3.3 International threat perceptions | 58 |
| 2.3.4 Attitudes toward foreign countries, their leaders, and transatlantic relations | 63 |
| 2.4 Policies | 69 |
| 2.4.1 Introduction | 69 |
| 2.4.2 Providing collective security: NATO, EU, or both? | 70 |
| 2.4.3 War and military interventions | 79 |
| 2.4.4 International terrorism | 98 |
| 2.4.5 Nuclear proliferation | 103 |
| 2.5 Summary and implications | 108 |
| 3 Policy postures and elite politics as determinants of public opinion | 114 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 114 |
| 3.2 Data, measurement, and methods | 122 |
| 3.3 Explaining foreign and security policy attitudes | 130 |
| 3.3.1 The Kosovo war | 130 |
| 3.3.2 International terrorism | 138 |
| 3.3.3 The Afghanistan War | 146 |
| 3.3.4 The Iraq War | 154 |
| 3.3.5 The Iranian nuclear program | 168 |
| 3.3.6 NATO | 174 |
| 3.3.7 Transatlantic relations | 190 |
| 3.4 Summary and implications | 209 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | Conclusion | 214 |
| | References | 228 |
| | Figures | 253 |
| | Tables | 269 |
| | Appendix A: Data sets | 299 |
| | Appendix B1: Question wording for Figures | 303 |
| | Appendix B2: Question wording for Tables | 310 |
| | Appendix B3: Question wording for results reported in the text only | 321 |
| | Index | Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. |

List of Figures

| | |
|---|-----|
| Figure 1: Attitudes toward international involvement, 1982-2010 | 253 |
| Figure 2: Attitudes toward the use of force, 2003-2010..... | 254 |
| Figure 3: Attitudes toward conscription in Germany, 1989-2010..... | 255 |
| Figure 4: Attitudes toward decreasing defense spending, 1981-2010..... | 256 |
| Figure 5: Desirability of United States and European Union world leadership, 2002-2010 | 257 |
| Figure 6: Attitudes toward NATO membership, 1981-2010..... | 258 |
| Figure 7: Public support for military mission in Somalia, 1993 | 259 |
| Figure 8: Determinants of support for a military intervention in Kosovo, 1998-1999..... | 260 |
| Figure 9: Determinants of support for the use of troops to maintain peace in the post-conflict Balkans, 2007.. | 260 |
| Figure 10: Determinants of approval of air strikes against terrorist camps, 2002..... | 261 |
| Figure 11: Determinants of approval of own troops in Afghanistan, 2004 | 261 |
| Figure 12: Determinants of approval of number of troops in Afghanistan, 2009 | 262 |
| Figure 13: Determinants of approval of troops for reconstruction in Afghanistan, 2007..... | 262 |
| Figure 14: Determinants of public support for an invasion of Iraq, 2002 | 263 |
| Figure 15: Determinants of public beliefs the war in Iraq was worth it, 2003-2004..... | 263 |
| Figure 16: Determinants of beliefs that the Iraq war increased the threat of terrorism, 2004 | 264 |
| Figure 17: Determinants of attitudes toward attacking Iran, 2003 | 264 |
| Figure 18: Determinants of the perception of common values between Europe and the United States, 2004.... | 265 |
| Figure 19: Determinants of the perception of common values between Europe and the United States, 2009.... | 265 |
| Figure 20: Influence of militarism on support for a more independent European foreign policy in Germany, 2004-2010 | 266 |
| Figure 21: Influence of partisan affiliation on support for a more independent European foreign policy in Germany, 2004-2010 | 266 |
| Figure 22: Influence of militarist orientations on support for U.S. leadership in the world in Germany, 2002-2010 | 267 |
| Figure 23: Determinants of attitudes toward EU economic vs. military power, 2005 | 267 |
| Figure 24: Determinants of attitudes toward a common European army, 2005 | 268 |

List of Tables

| | |
|--|-----|
| Table 1: Attitudes toward multilateralism, 2002-2007..... | 269 |
| Table 2: Biggest foreign policy problems facing Germany, 1988-2003 | 270 |
| Table 3: Biggest foreign policy problems facing the U.S., 1982-2002 | 271 |
| Table 4: Perceived threats to the vital interests of the U.S., 1990-2010..... | 272 |
| Table 5: Perceived threats to the vital interests of the European Union in Germany, 2002-2006..... | 273 |
| Table 6: Perceived personal threats in the United States, 2005-2008 | 274 |
| Table 7: Perceived personal threats in Germany, 1997-2005..... | 274 |
| Table 8: Perceived personal threats in Germany, 2006-2010..... | 275 |
| Table 9: Feelings toward foreign countries in the United States, 1982-2010..... | 276 |
| Table 10: Feelings toward foreign countries in Germany, 1992-2009..... | 277 |
| Table 11: Attitudes toward the transatlantic partnership in security, 2004-2010..... | 278 |
| Table 12: Attitudes toward NATO membership in Germany, 1981-2007 | 279 |
| Table 13: Attitudes toward NATO membership in the U.S., 1982-2010..... | 280 |
| Table 14: Necessity of NATO membership for security, 2002-2010..... | 280 |
| Table 15: Attitudes toward superpower status of the European Union, 2002-2005..... | 281 |
| Table 16: Attitudes toward the military role of the European Union, 2003-2005..... | 282 |
| Table 17: Support for the use of force against Iraq in Germany, 1991 | 282 |
| Table 18: Support for troop deployment to Kosovo, 1998-2007 | 283 |
| Table 19: Support for troop deployment to Afghanistan, 2001-2004 | 283 |
| Table 20: Support for different military operations in Afghanistan, 2007-2008..... | 284 |
| Table 21: Attitudes toward number of troops in Afghanistan, 2009-2010..... | 284 |
| Table 22: Attitudes toward attack on Iraq in the U.S., 2003-2004..... | 285 |
| Table 23: Attitudes toward attack on Iraq in Germany, 2003-2004..... | 285 |
| Table 24: Support for counterterrorism measures, 1998-2010..... | 285 |
| Table 25: Preference for military action vs. sanctions if a country is threatening a neighbor with nuclear weapons, 2003..... | 286 |
| Table 26: Support for military action if North Korea or Iran acquired nuclear weapons, 2003..... | 286 |
| Table 27: Attitudes toward strategies to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, 2006-2010 | 287 |
| Table 28: Foreign policy orientations as measured in the Transatlantic Trends Surveys, 2002-2010 | 288 |
| Table 29: Predicted probabilities of attitudes toward military action in Kosovo, 1998-1999 and 2007 | 289 |
| Table 30: Predicted probabilities of attitudes toward the war in Iraq, 2002-2004 | 289 |
| Table 31: Determinants of support for NATO membership in the U.S., 1982-2010 | 290 |
| Table 32: Predicted probabilities of NATO support by foreign policy orientations in the U.S., 1982-2010 | 290 |
| Table 33: Determinants of support for NATO membership in Germany, 1989-2000 | 291 |
| Table 34: Support for NATO membership by party affiliation and militarist orientations in Germany, 1989-2000 | 292 |
| Table 35: Determinants of perceived necessity of NATO in Germany, 2004-2010 | 292 |
| Table 36: Determinants of perceived necessity of NATO membership in the U.S., 2004-2010..... | 293 |
| Table 37: Predicted probabilities of perceptions of NATO still being essential by foreign policy orientations, 2004-2010 | 293 |
| Table 38: Predicted probabilities of perceptions of NATO still being essential by party affiliation, 2004-2010..... | 294 |
| Table 39: Determinants of attitudes toward independence in transatlantic relations, 2004-2010 | 295 |
| Table 40: Determinants of attitudes toward U.S. leadership in the world in Germany, 2002-2010..... | 296 |
| Table 41: Determinants of attitudes toward EU leadership in the world in the United States, 2002-2010 | 297 |
| Table 42: Determinants of attitudes toward Europe becoming a superpower, 2002-2005..... | 298 |

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|--|
| APW | America's Place in the World |
| BMVG | Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Germany Ministry of Defense) |
| CCFR | Chicago Council on Foreign Relations |
| CCGA | Chicago Council on Global Affairs |
| DK/RF | Don't know/Refused |
| EU | European Union |
| GAP | Global Attitudes Project |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| KLA | Kosovo Liberation Army |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OEF | Operation Enduring Freedom |
| R2P | Responsibility to Protect |
| SALT | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks |
| SOWI | Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der <i>Bundeswehr</i> (Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences) |
| START | Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty |
| TTIP | Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership |
| TTS | Transatlantic Trends Survey |
| UN | United Nations |
| WDD | Die Welt der Deutschen im Wandel (The world of the Germans in transition) |
| ZMSBw | Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der <i>Bundeswehr</i> (<i>Bundeswehr</i> Center for Military History and Social Sciences) |

1 Introduction

1.1 U.S.-German relations in the post-Cold War era from a citizen perspective

When studying U.S.-German relations from a public opinion perspective, the trajectory in the post-Cold War era shows considerable variability on different dimensions. Throughout the 1990's public opinion in Germany and the United States was quite similar with regard to perceptions of the foreign and security environment, policy issues, and of each other. At the same time, mutual sentiments were not exuberant (Isernia 2007: 79; Holsti 2008: 179). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 triggered a huge wave of German sympathy for the transatlantic ally and rekindled a feeling of common fate – which had been somewhat lost in the previous decade (Szabo 2004; Isernia 2006: 138). Despite their general reluctance to support the use of military force Germans were even willing to follow the American call to arms in the case of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan (Isernia 2006: 141).¹ This renewed transatlantic harmony was short-lived, however, as the Iraq war led to serious dissonance regarding the views of each other, over policy directions, and the preferred conduct of foreign policy more generally (Szabo 2004: 85; Holsti 2008: 17-63; Oppermann 2011: 131). After some years of cooler relations it then was the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 which was associated with a recovery of German sentiment toward the United States (Hatlapa and Markovits 2010: 71; Kelley 2011: 20; Everts and Isernia 2015: 79).

How do we account for this development of public opinion? At first sight it might be tempting to read these findings as evidence bolstering the notion that ordinary citizens do not possess coherent attitudes toward foreign policy and international relations but follow their moods of the day, resulting in highly volatile public sentiments (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955). Well in accordance with neorealism in the study of international relations (e.g., Waltz 1979) this line of reasoning also suggests that citizens' flimsy opinions are incapable of affecting electoral behavior. Therefore, elites would have no incentive to inventory or even heed public

¹ In this book we will often use the term “America” to refer to the United States.

opinion on foreign affairs. Subscribing to this interpretation requires some ignorance of a sizeable body of research lending support to the opposite conclusion, however (Holsti 2004: 1-22). Scholars of this “rational public” persuasion argue that, despite a lack of knowledge, consistency, and stability at the individual level, the public as a whole responds reasonably to foreign policy events and policy proposals (see, e.g., Shapiro and Page 1988; Jentleson 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Isernia et al. 2002). In addition, individual-level evidence suggests that citizens are capable of making sense of foreign affairs relying on some kind of low-information rationality (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985). Foreign policy attitudes, in turn, make a difference in electoral behavior in the U.S. (Aldrich et al. 1989; Rattinger 1990b; Norpoth and Sidman 2007) as well as in Germany (for moderate effects see Rattinger 1990c: 378; Schoen 2004b; Pöttschke et al. 2015).

As the quick answer is not satisfactory, we may turn to substantive theories of foreign policy attitudes. In the foreign policy domain images of and feelings toward other countries are promising candidates (Jervis 1976; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). In this view the affect people hold toward certain countries serves as some kind of heuristic, driving their evaluations of foreign policy and international relations involving these countries (e.g., Brady and Sniderman 1985). This line of reasoning receives considerable support from a variety of research (Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Schafer 1997; Herrmann et al. 1999; Liberman 2006). Yet it does not suffice to account for the rollercoaster-like trajectory of U.S. and German public opinion toward foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. As affect toward foreign countries is likely to be based on stereotyping – and thus rather stable over time – this model is not that well suited to fully account for a series of ups and downs.

An interest-based approach may also look promising in the foreign policy domain. There is indeed some evidence that citizens consider narrow self-interest or the national interest when evaluating foreign policy (Mueller 1973; Jentleson 1992; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi et al. 2006). Leaving

aside the issue of whether self and national interest change quickly, available research also suggests that material self and national interest strictly speaking play only a limited role in explaining citizens' attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy (Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1991; Lau and Heldman 2009). Thus a narrow conception of self-interest also is unlikely to yield a successful explanation.

Given the remoteness of international relations from citizens' daily lives, elites may play a considerable role in forming their foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, a bulk of research suggests that by expounding their own positions parties give cues upon which voters may rely when forming opinions toward foreign policy (e.g., Zaller 1992; Ray 2003; Berinsky 2009). In particular stronger party identifiers who engage in partisan motivated reasoning may be inclined to follow the lead of their parties (e.g., Falter et al. 2000; Bartels 2002; Lodge and Taber 2005; Steenbergen and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2013). Yet, as already noted, citizens' foreign policy attitudes are not merely reflections of partisan attachments but also have the capacity to shape party choice in return. Therefore parties have incentives to consider public opinion when debating foreign policy in order to avoid electoral losses (e.g., Eichenberg 1989: 235-241). Depending on the nature of public opinion elites may choose to campaign on foreign policy, downplay policies that are at odds with prevailing public sentiments, or even choose to pursue policies that are not likely to arouse public awareness, let alone opposition (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro 1999; LaBalme 2001; Sobel 2001; Jacobs and Page 2005; Schoen 2010). Public opinion thus is not to be discounted. It matters for foreign policy making, though by degree: It may call for justifications, may limit the leeway of elites, or may even force them to pursue a certain course of action (Rosenau 1961, 1969).

This brief review thus leaves us with the conclusion that elites and citizens are linked together by a complex interplay that does not lend itself to a straightforward analysis. What is more, it gives rise to the nagging question which part of public opinion elites take into account when, at the same time, they may influence and shape public opinion. A hint at a reasonable answer

to this question can be gained from the constructivist perspective of international relations (Wendt 1992). In this line of reasoning cultural factors including identities, norms, and values make a difference in foreign policy and international relations. As these concepts are not highly volatile it is reasonable for elites to take them into consideration when thinking about responses to public opinion.

While relying on constructivist suggestions in terms of concepts we do not, however, fully subscribe to their predictions concerning the transatlantic relationship in the post-Cold War era (Ikenberry 1996; Risse 2012). To be sure, we agree that the United States and Germany share many values and (socially construed) interests that make transatlantic relations more persistent (transitory disagreement notwithstanding) than neorealists have suggested. Taking a closer look, however, cultural differences in the foreign policy domain emerge that imply a latent tension between the United States and Germany. Depending on circumstances this tension gives rise to open conflict, potentially undermining transatlantic relations. So we suggest that – despite their stability – cultural factors do not imply a steady equilibrium in transatlantic relations but allow for considerable changes. We thus think that it is valuable to build on cultural factors when providing an account for the rollercoaster-like development of the relations between the United States and Germany at the citizen level in the post-Cold War era.

1.2 Core postures, parties, and U.S.-German relations: A model and some expectations

A considerable body of literature about international relations points to the significance of strategic culture for foreign policy making (Snyder 1977; Johnston 1995; Berger 1998; Duffield 1999; Giegerich and Wallace 2010; Biehl et al. 2013). This concept refers to values, norms, attitudes, and beliefs guiding decision-making in the foreign and security domain. To be sure, in this literature strategic culture was introduced to describe elites. However, as a cultural phenomenon it also refers to and affects citizens' reasoning and behavior. Citizens

may subscribe to certain beliefs, values, and norms that guide their reasoning when it comes to foreign and defense policy. We thus use the term “foreign policy culture” to refer to this domain-specific culture encompassing both the elite and citizen level. As with political culture in general (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye 1968) there are different methods to empirically investigate strategic cultures, including discourse analysis at the elite level as well as large-scale surveys of citizens (e.g., Endres et al. 2015a; Irondelle et al. 2015).

As with political culture, norms and values are key to foreign policy culture. Prior research suggests that a multitude of themes play a role in pertinent debates, ranging from a country’s role in the international system via instruments of foreign policy to procedures of decision-making regarding this policy domain. In this analysis we focus on three dimensions that refer to fundamental questions in international relations: The extent of involvement in the international system; cooperation and compromise in the international arena; and, finally, suitable and legitimate instruments in the pursuit of goals in the international arena (Holsti 1979; Wittkopf 1990; Hinckley 1992; Chittick and Freyberg-Inan 2001; Juhász 2001). The first issue revolves around the question of getting involved in international affairs. In a simple ideal-typical distinction supporters of international involvement are opposed by skeptics pleading for self-restraint or even isolationism. Second, when interacting with each other state actors may differ in how they conceive of the relationship between different such actors. For some the international arena is a place with little room for cooperation and compromise. These states rather act on their own and pursue their own interests. In a contrasting conception states may cooperate in order to pursue shared goals, and maybe even subordinate their own immediate national interest to that of allies. We can thus distinguish between preferences for unilateral and multilateral action.² Finally, when it comes to the choice of instruments in the

² This is not the only way unilateralism and multilateralism can be understood. The terms are also often used to describe the use of international organizations and negotiations to pursue national interests, i.e. the choice of a specific arena for conducting foreign policy. In yet another conception multilateralism refers to certain standards the coordination process between states has to meet (for a discussion of these aspects see, e.g., Keohane 1990; Ruggie 1993; Ash 1994).

international arena, a crucial question concerns the use of military force. Leaving aside a multitude of mixtures of all shades the use of force may be considered a legitimate (if not preferable) means to pursue goals in the international arena or it may be rejected as a matter of principle.³ Taken together these three dimensions revolve around principles of foreign and defense policy, and we may designate them for the sake of convenience as internationalism, multilateralism, and militarism.⁴

At the individual level internationalism, multilateralism, and militarism are represented as core foreign policy postures in citizens' belief systems (Rathbun 2007). Opinions about these principles have sources in personality traits and general values and can be conceived of as part of a person's identity that is easily invoked when citizens think about foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Rathbun 2007; Schoen 2007; Pöttschke et al. 2012). Given these characteristics domain-specific predispositions, like values (Kluckhohn 1951; Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992), are rather stable over time and may serve as yardsticks to evaluate various policy proposals, decisions, and events, thereby lending some coherence and stability to foreign-policy attitudes toward various specific issues (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Feldman 1988; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Goren 2001; Jedinger and Mader 2015; Mader 2015b).

Following this line of reasoning, at the aggregate level differences in foreign policy cultures may come in two guises. Differences in the marginal distributions of these individual-level core postures are quite straightforward indicators of cultural differences. At a more subtle level differences in the relationships between foreign policy postures also hint at differences between foreign policy cultures (Endres et al. 2015a). The latter are influential in shaping the

³ Our use of the term thus does not incorporate the notion of militarism as the degree to which other social domains are characterized by norms, values, and organization principles of the military domain.

⁴ Note that these terms represent, at the same time, the end points of the three dimensions. The opposite ends could be termed as isolationism, unilateralism, and anti-militarism, respectively. In this book we will often use these terms to characterize policies and actors as being located closer to one end of a given dimension. By denoting, e.g., the German public as anti-militaristic we do not mean to say that all citizens exhibit extreme values of this dimension but rather that they are predominantly located on the left side of continuum between anti-militarism and militarism.

bundles of policy options (e.g., use of military force with or without multilateral cooperation) that public debates focus on and citizens think about. The significance of differences in marginal distributions stems from the role that core postures serve as yardsticks for policy evaluation.⁵ Differences between societies in postures translate into differences in policy evaluations. A society with a smaller proportion of voters accepting the use of military force will certainly also have a smaller proportion of supporters of sending troops abroad to fight. By contrast, similarity in values will lead to similar responses to policies and events. In particular transnational agreement on core postures may be conducive to the evolution of a transnational “sense of community” (Deutsch et al. 1957; see also Biava et al. 2011).

This prediction regarding public opinion is likely to understate the significance of foreign policy cultures, however. We have to keep in mind that parties are key players in domestic politics and are likely to constantly have an eye on public opinion when debating foreign policy. A policy proposal well in line with a country’s foreign policy culture (i.e. only a tiny proportion of the electorate opposes it) is unlikely to provoke extensive and fierce partisan debates. By contrast, a proposal that is at odds with core foreign policy postures of a large segment of the electorate provides an opportunity for parties supporting these policy principles to provoke a controversial public debate in which political parties play a key role. We thus focus on debates along partisan lines although foreign policy issues may also give rise to debates across party lines. In the latter case, however, elite signals may be not as informative and important for citizens’ information processing. Likewise, party elites might be hesitant to engage in heated debates along party lines because of potentially detrimental effects in the electoral arena.

Partisan debates play a dual role in citizens’ opinion formation on foreign policy. As explained above, by arguing for a policy position parties may give cues on which voters may

⁵ As already outlined above, core foreign policy postures are not the only factors feeding into evaluations of foreign policy and events (for reviews see Aldrich et al. 2006; Rattinger 2007; Baum and Potter 2008; Endres et al. 2015b). As far as other factors play a role, the impact of core postures may be attenuated.

rely on when forming opinions toward foreign policy (e.g., Zaller 1992; Ray 2003; Berinsky 2009). Moreover, parties may affect the role of core foreign policy postures in citizens' opinion formation. Political parties, like mass media, may attempt to strategically shape citizens' perceptions, among other things by employing priming and framing strategies in order to create public support for or opposition against a policy proposal (Taber 2003; Sniderman and Bullock 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007a, 2007b; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). A party attempting to foster public support for a military mission in a predominantly pacifist public, e.g., might aim at downplaying the use of military force and rather try to highlight humanitarianism or the goal of containing a malevolent and widely disliked foe (e.g., Herrmann et al. 1999; Gelpi et al. 2009; Mader and Schoen 2013). By contrast, a party aiming at strengthening opposition against the same mission may highlight the use of military force, thereby making the militarism dimension more salient for citizens' opinion formation. Among people subscribing to this portrayal of the conflict the impact of predispositions toward the use of military force on opinion formation will increase – and so probably will rejection of the proposal.⁶

This intra-society perspective is only one possible venue through which political debates can shape public opinion formation. An inter-society perspective suggests that partisan debate could have additional effects if core principles are not only invoked to argue about the own country's foreign policies but also are applied directly to other countries and their policies. Depending on the nature of the policies, both intra- and inter-societal levels of discourse may be conducive to a sense of community or some kind of estrangement, depending on which policy principles are highlighted and used as yardsticks when evaluating other countries' conduct in the international realm.⁷ If a foreign country subscribes to the same values individuals will tend to like it better. In this way an ally may become a close ally, or citizens

⁶ As we noted above, attitudes toward foreign policy might also affect electoral behavior. By raising a foreign policy controversy parties might thus attempt to make foreign policy attitudes more salient for voting behavior in an attempt to improve their electoral chances.

⁷ For the role of culture in shaping images of other nations see Deutsch et al. (1957), Herrmann et al. (1997).

may cease to conceive of a country as an enemy. If, however, value-alerted voters witness differences in foreign policy principles they may criticize the other country. Depending on the nature of the initial relationship a negative image of this country will become rock solid, or citizens may call into question a formerly close partnership.⁸

This model is able to illuminate the development of German-American relations after the end of the Cold War. To illustrate the kind of predictions it generates the following section applies it to several specific issues from the recent past. The elements which make up the model constitute a certain hierarchical order. The model has not only predictive value with regard to the yardsticks citizens use in evaluating political objects, but also taxonomical utility regarding the implications of agreement and dissent over a given object for the state of the transatlantic community. Following research on political support (e.g., Easton 1975; Niedermayer and Westle 1995) citizens' postures toward core political values, norms, and collectivities can be understood as more fundamental and thus more important than opinions referring to specific objects, such as political authorities and policies. From the perspective of research on political support they resemble the regime principles which play an important role in lending structure and stability to a country's political culture (Easton 1975; Norris 1999). Descending the ladder from core values to specific policies support turns from diffuse to specific. The latter is less fundamental and more transitory in nature than diffuse support. Accordingly, given its over-time stability diffuse support provides a buffer helpful to ride out a lack of specific support. Given a lack of diffuse support, however, specific support alone is unlikely to guarantee a resilient political system.

Although the relationship between the United States and Germany does not strictly represent a political system, it is highly useful to apply this conceptualization of political objects to our

⁸ Once developed such country images may themselves constitute yardsticks for actor and policy evaluation. Especially if the sense of community is very strong, citizens from different nations may come to view each other as members of the same ingroup, triggering social identity processes such as ingroup-conformity and favoritism as well as outgroup-derogation (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). Once transformed into such social identities the sense of community may endure even if the shared values and world views which originally gave rise to it are no longer shared.

analysis. In this vein, core values, norms, and perceptions and evaluations of political collectivities are most vital to the question of whether the transatlantic partnership is in good shape. Perceptions and evaluations of political authorities, leaders, and specific policies are at the bottom of this ladder of substantive significance. Unlike conflict over fundamental norms and values differences in opinion regarding these objects represent disagreements which are unlikely to endure and to undermine the transatlantic relationship.

We now turn to the application of our model to processes of opinion formation about foreign policy in the United States and Germany during the post-Cold War era. Given its cognitive-interactionist nature (e.g., Herrmann et al. 1999) a characterization of the more general foreign policy culture of the two societies is the first step. As a well-developed body of research shows, both similarities and differences between the United States and Germany exist in this regard (see, e.g., Gray 1981; Risse-Kappen 1996; Duffield 1999; Szabo 2004; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2006). This is certainly true for core foreign policy principles. Both countries have foreign policy cultures favoring international involvement in the international system rather than isolation. When it comes to compromise and cooperation in the international arena, however, some differences appear to exist. To be sure, both countries' cultures favor cooperation and compromise in the international arena. Indeed, for Germany multilateralism is a fundamental principle guiding conduct in international politics that may even override the pursuit of substantive goals. An indicator for the strong preference for a multilateral approach is Germany's tight integration within the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as in the United Nations (UN). The United States generally also prefer a multilateral approach to international relations. Yet, when pressed, the U.S. may also choose unilateral action if that is the only way to attain valued goals. A similar difference concerns the choice of instruments in international politics. For the United States the use of military force is a legitimate (though not always preferred) means to attain its goals. If pressed the U.S. may even decide to use military force

unilaterally. In this respect Germany subscribes to considerably different norms. The post-World War II foreign policy culture of Germany entails a deeply rooted skepticism against the use of military force. It may only be considered under certain restrictive conditions. First, a multilateral approach always is a prerequisite for Germany contemplating the use of military force. Second, military force as a means for the pursuit of national interests is deemed much more problematic than employing military force to attain humanitarian goals.

Taken together, the United States and Germany differ somewhat on the three focal dimensions of foreign policy culture. While both are primarily internationalist the two remaining dimensions separate the two countries. Germany strongly prefers a combination of multilateralism and anti-militarism. By contrast, the United States, though not rejecting multilateralism and peaceful action, are far more inclined also to consider unilateral and military action. To oversimplify, Germans more look like Venetians, whereas Americans appear to resemble Martians (e.g., Malici 2006).

Given these somewhat different cultures, we now turn to the end of the Cold War and the ensuing opportunities and challenges for the United States and Germany in the foreign policy domain. During the Cold War the United States was West Germany's most important ally, and West Germany was the most exposed front-line state within the U.S.-led Western alliance. From the very beginning shared perceptions of severe threat from the communist Soviet bloc and a set of common values were the foundation for this alliance. It was further stabilized by economic integration and its key institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has now been around for much longer than half a century (regardless of ups and downs). Although the transatlantic alliance has certainly been a success story, it never lacked crises. The most important ones developed in the later 1960s and the early 1980s. Many West Europeans, including Germans, vehemently protested against the American war in Vietnam, an opposition which was fueled by divergences in threat perceptions and in basic values (e.g., Nau 2008). Relations again were severely strained following the NATO dual-track decision.

Especially young and highly educated Germans articulated their strong disapproval of rearmament with nuclear missiles (Szabo 1983a, 1983b; Rattinger 1985b; Eichenberg 1989). Both periods of strained transatlantic relations suggest that values and principles do make a difference in the foreign policy realm.

The end of the Cold War profoundly changed the international system and the conditions for foreign policy both for Germany and the United States. The sea changes of 1989-1990 put an end to the previous bi-polar world and gave rise to the notion of a uni-polar or multi-polar setup. The disappearing of old walls and borders became palpable in the eastward expansion of both NATO and the EU (see, e.g., Tocci and Alcaro 2014: 372). For the U.S. the demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc implied changed American geopolitical interests. The decline of the Soviet Union reduced incentives to focus attention on Europe, and Germany in particular. In the emerging multi-polar international system other regions, especially Asia, attracted American concerns (e.g., Nau 2008: 84; Tocci and Alcaro 2014: 372-374). For Germany the end of the Cold War led to the reunification of the Western and Eastern parts of the country that formerly had belonged to hostile blocs for about four decades. Moreover, with reunification Germany at long last gained full sovereignty, which also widened the scope of foreign policy options. In particular, there were no longer allied objections to sending German troops abroad on military missions. And that was probably one item on the list the U.S. government had in mind when offering Germany “partnership in leadership” in 1990.

These massive changes to the international system did not immediately also change the two countries’ foreign policy cultures. For the United States the use of military force, even unilaterally, is not deemed illegitimate as a matter of principle. Rather this is a matter of choice. To be sure, there is no unequivocal consensus on the unilateral use of military force. But there are significant actors enough voicing a preference for this kind of foreign policy. In the Cold War era bipartisanship prevailed in U.S. foreign policy, until the Vietnam War led to fierce partisan conflict. Despite some changes in intensity and content this basic partisan

controversy has endured over the years and prevails even in the post-Cold War era. Notwithstanding some isolationist voices both parties prefer an internationalist position. Partisan disagreement arises, however, when it comes to the role of the U.S. in the international arena. Beginning in the early 1990s, it became clear that Republicans were predisposed to conceive of the United States as a superpower legitimately pursuing her national interest unilaterally and with military force, if required. The Democratic Party, by contrast, prefers a more accommodationist approach with a preference for multilateralism and diplomacy over acting unilaterally and using military force (Fabbrini 2004: 89; Holsti 2004: 121).

Given unified Germany's foreign policy culture of multilateralism and anti-militarism the new option of now using military force was not widely perceived as an opportunity but rather as a burden. Despite some pressure from allies to do so, Germany was not quick to remove constitutional restrictions on the use of military force, but only did so reluctantly. However, even today the deployment of military forces still is subject to various constitutional restrictions that constrain military action. Moreover, any such government action requires approval by parliament, which is quite hesitant to support unilateral military plans. Furthermore, the *Bundeswehr* simply does not possess the required capabilities (troops, equipment, and infrastructure) to engage in major "out-of-area" missions on its own (e.g., Meiers 2010). German military action thus almost by necessity always occurs within a multilateral framework, rather than unilaterally.

Provided Germany does send troops abroad, the anti-militarist foreign policy culture has further implications. For one thing, politicians aiming at creating or sustaining support for (or at weakening opposition to) any such mission are very likely to downplay the actual use of military force. For another thing, the specific foreign policy culture requires German politicians to provide the "right reasons" (Juhász 2001: 58) for the deployment of troops and the use of military force, even in a multilateral framework. Using military force as a means to

pursue national interests does not fare well in Germany. Rather, the anti-militarist culture is more favorable of humanitarian goals when it comes to the use of military force (Juhász 2001; Asmus et al. 2004, 2005).

Like in the United States, German parties differ considerably on foreign policy, potentially giving rise to partisan controversy over this matter (e.g., Duffield 1999; Katsioulis 2004; Schuster 2012). To be sure, a far-ranging internationalist consensus prevails in the German multi-party system, although The Left (*Die Linke*)⁹ does not fully subscribe to it. This certainly is noteworthy but is not that important politically because this party has never been part of a federal government. German parties also share a preference for multilateralism but diverge over the exact meaning of this concept. In the period under study the center-right parties (i.e. the CDU/CSU and FDP) have subscribed to the notion that agreement within the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations all are very important. If pressed, however, they usually prefer agreement in NATO. For the center-left parties things are somewhat different. The Social Democrats and, even more so, the Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) interpret multilateralism more to imply agreement at the level of the United Nations or European Union, rather than within NATO. This preference also reflects some dislike of the U.S. This sentiment is particularly strong within The Left (the successor of the former communist GDR state-party) where agreement with NATO policies is usually quite weak. Unlike the other parties on the left side of the ideological spectrum The Left even shows estrangement from the European project insofar as it symbolizes a project of the (capitalist) West. When it comes to the use of military force German parties are united by an anti-militarist consensus. Still, they differ in the conditions under which they might be willing to consider the use of military force. In a somewhat simplified account we have center-right parties less reluctant to support the use of military force than center-left parties. For the

⁹ We will use the term “The Left” to denote both *Die Linke*, which was founded in 2007, and its relevant predecessor, the PDS.

Greens in particular pacifism is an important principle that, however, may be overridden by competing arguments, including humanitarian goals.

Given the two countries' differences with regard to militarism and multilateralism the post-Cold War constellation implies a latent tension for transatlantic relations. As long as unilateral action or use of military force are not invoked foreign policy disagreement between the U.S. and German publics is unlikely to occur. And vice versa, these two ingredients are likely to lead to differences in evaluations of foreign policy. If, in addition, parties choose to raise principle-based debates, these differences might become more pronounced and extend from the foreign policy domain to the transatlantic relationship in general. Conversely, agreement on norms and values will be conducive to a transnational "sense of community" (Deutsch et al. 1957). Therefore, cases in which the United States asks the German government to participate in international military action provide political parties with opportunities to capitalize on. Given the parties' positions on foreign policy this is most likely to arise when unilateralist and militarist Republicans aim for unilateral military action while German center-left parties choose to stick to pacifist and inclusive multilateralist principles.

When the Cold War ended this latent tension appeared to be only of academic interest because the international system was expected by many to become less threatening and conflict-prone, and political leaders and pundits alike envisaged some sort of "peace dividend" resulting from significant disarmament. Unfortunately the international system did not at all become as peaceful as expected, or at least hoped for. Soon "new wars" (Münkler 2004) broke out, including many bloody civil wars. Another phenotype of the "new wars", and arguably its most distinctive form, is international terrorism, which renders the traditional differentiation in the law of war between combatants and non-combatants obsolete. With its offensive on the territory of even the most developed, affluent, and powerful nations it seeks to break political will and to hurt economic systems (Münkler 2004). This immediate threat became

dramatically manifest for Americans in the attacks of September 11, 2001, but also reached Europe in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.

These examples suggest that novel threats could trigger conflict between the United States and Germany. If the United States chooses to tackle these threats using military force, a difference in opinion about foreign policy is likely to emerge, with Germany's anti-militarist culture at the root of the opinion gap between the two publics. Difference in opinion, however, will trigger acute disagreement and extend from the foreign policy domain to the transatlantic relationship more generally only if political parties decide to debate this issue in terms of policy principles. Because this kind of debate is likely to make citizens more aware of disagreement over core values, the transatlantic relationship as perceived by German and U.S. citizens will deteriorate.

Since international conflicts which lead to the use of military force are most likely to trigger transatlantic controversies and crises at the public opinion level, we will now provide a brief outline of four conflicts during these years to which the United States and Germany have responded quite differently. In each case we use our model to generate hypotheses about how (elite) context and individual level characteristics interact to form policy attitudes. While some of these hypotheses also will be confronted with data in the following empirical chapters, the goal here is rather to demonstrate the theoretical model in action.

Starting with the civil war in Somalia as our first case, in the early 1990s the initial argument for an intervention by the United Nations was mainly to facilitate and secure humanitarian relief operations. Germany contributed logistical support to the mission. The German center-right governing coalition stressed the humanitarian goal throughout the intervention as well as the necessity of Germany demonstrating solidarity with its allies by making a contribution to international efforts for conflict resolution. While the desirability of these goals was not contested, the German public debate revolved around the constitutionality of deploying troops

abroad, with the opposition parties questioning the German participation on these legalistic grounds (Philippi 1997).

The United States carried the bulk of the burden in terms of troops deployed. The humanitarian goals were supported by large elite majorities across the partisan aisle, but bipartisan consensus eroded when the mission's objectives changed from the focus on purely humanitarian relief to the stabilization of the political situation in the country (Burk 1999: 72; Longhurst 2004: 60; Larson and Savych 2005: 29-30). The pictures of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by an angry mob in October 1993 ignited elite conflict over the mission. Soon after the incident, which has become a symbol for several failed intervention efforts of this period (Mandelbaum 1996), President Clinton announced the withdrawal of American troops. The other nations participating in the mission, including Germany, followed suit. Soon afterward all foreign troops left the country, and the civil war in this failed state has continued up to this very day.

Our model suggests similarities and differences in public opinion formation regarding the Somalia intervention on the two sides of the Atlantic. As to the similarities, the deployment of military personnel always represents international involvement, irrespective of the goals pursued. Therefore we would expect attitudes toward the Somalia engagement to be rooted in part in postures toward this overarching foreign policy principle on both sides of the Atlantic: Citizens preferring an active approach should be more supportive of sending troops to Somalia than citizens with isolationist preferences. Given the small role combat operations played in the mission, opinions about anti-militarism should play a minor role in the United States. But with principled anti-militaristic positions in Germany and since this was the first military deployment beyond NATO borders these postures still might have played a role – despite elites' attempts to downplay the military aspect of the mission. Furthermore, the model predicts a greater relevance of multilateralism in German public opinion formation than in America, given its salience in one and its virtual irrelevance in the other country's

public debates. As the two countries were not in dispute over the Somalia mission we would expect it not to have affected German-American relations.

Meanwhile, war also raged on the European continent: As a consequence of the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia witnessed a severe secessionist crisis leading to considerable internal turmoil and bloodshed. The Yugoslav army sought to render the declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and (a bit later) Bosnia-Herzegovina ineffective by military action. The wars with Croatia, and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, went down in history as being characterized by extreme acts of violence and ethnic cleansing (see, e.g., Münkler 2004). Yet for a long time the reaction of the West was restrained and military intervention was limited. However, as the situation worsened and peace talks repeatedly failed, in the spring of 1999 NATO launched an air war against Serbian targets first in Kosovo and later in Serbia itself.

In Germany the potential deployment of *Bundeswehr* troops to Yugoslavia rekindled the debate about “out-of-area” missions, which was only subdued after the pathbreaking decision by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 that it was constitutional for Germany to attend to (all) duties connected to its membership in collective security organizations (see, e.g., Longhurst 2004: 46). Nevertheless, even after this legal endorsement the German contribution in Bosnia remained limited. One of the arguments forwarded by the German government was that no German soldier should enter foreign territory which had been occupied by Nazi Germany during World War II (e.g., Bierling 2014: 29). Yet this so-called “Kohl doctrine” became obsolete at the latest when German troops did participate in the Kosovo war. The German contribution, albeit small in scope and numbers, was of paramount significance for the foreign and security outlook of the country, as it was the first combat mission the German military was involved in since the end of World War II and no UN mandate was secured for the intervention (Longhurst 2004: 54). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that a SPD and Green Party coalition government decided to send German troops to participate in this combat mission in spite of previously pacifist currents running strong in these left-of-center political

parties (Longhurst 2004: 60). Now the Schröder administration invoked moral obligations according to which the lesson for Germany to draw from history was not so much “never again war” but rather “never again Auschwitz”. The conservative opposition parties did not challenge the government’s decision which led to an absence of public debate along partisan lines.¹⁰ The rationale for this war was a humanitarian one, augmented by arguments about the German obligation to act as a responsible member of the alliance. In parallel to this military commitment the German government pursued intensive diplomatic efforts (Longhurst 2004: 69).

The United States also participated in the intervention, although traditional security concerns could not be brought forward (Larson and Savych 2005: 74-75). Especially after the experience in Somalia American leaders were reluctant to commit troops to a conflict which many saw as a problem primarily for the European allies to solve. Consequently President Clinton’s mainly moral arguments for an intervention met with strong domestic opposition (Holsti 2004: 121; Larson and Savych 2005: 54-57). Yet as the situation on the ground worsened quite quickly a political consensus emerged, with both political parties stressing the need to protect Kosovo Albanians from further persecution by the Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian army (Carey 2001: 79). Once the Clinton administration had decided to intervene militarily it acted more decisively than its European allies and carried, once more, the bulk of combat operations.

Against this backdrop our model suggests that foreign policy postures toward internationalism and militarism were important determinants of support for the Kosovo war in the United States and Germany. In both countries the key question was whether force should be used to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, i.e. whether or not to get involved in this crisis and, if yes,

¹⁰ This is not to say that public debate about the German participation was absent. The socialist party The Left (then still called PDS) was strictly against this intervention, and many dissenting voices could be heard from representatives of the other parties as well. Yet the decisive point for deriving predictions from our model is whether the debate was structured along partisan lines, i.e. whether clearly visible political camps existed, arguing for different positions, which would in turn give citizens clear and consistent clues on the issue.

whether military means should be used. In contrast, given its salience only in the German context, multilateralism should be a relevant posture there, and indeed one strand of public discourse was concerned with the German responsibility to become an exporter of security both for NATO members and beyond. Finally, given differences between the United States and Germany regarding the overall salience of the issue, our model predicts stronger effects of the core postures in Germany where it should have been easier for the public to bring their beliefs to bear on the issue.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a sea change in American foreign policy and led to two additional cases of interest, namely the military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the attacks the U.S. proclaimed a War on Terror. NATO invoked Article 5 of the treaty, its collective defense mechanism, and the UN mandated a broad coalition of states to force a regime change in Afghanistan. In this first conflict which came about as a direct consequence of 9/11 the United States and Germany fought together with many other allies against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and continue their effort to stabilize the country to this day. The war in Iraq must also be interpreted as a direct result of the terrorist attacks against the United States. The U.S. government saw the 2003 intervention as another element of the War on Terror, accusing the Iraqi regime of collaborating with international terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction. However, these reasons were contested all over the world. Germany, among other countries, refused to contribute openly to the intervention. The German government even engaged in open conflict with the leading transatlantic ally by criticizing American disregard for the United Nations and depicting the push for intervention as a military adventure without good reason.

The attacks of September 11 dramatically changed American foreign policy making. In the immediate aftermath of the events many aspects of U.S. foreign policy were re-evaluated in the light of the War on Terror (the same is true with regard to domestic policies, as evidenced in the Patriot Act). The new view of foreign affairs was manifested in a new national security

doctrine that prioritized national sovereignty and freedom of action. These goals were seen as legitimizing the use of military force in a broad range of scenarios, including preventive measures to counter (potential) threats with the help of ad-hoc coalitions (e.g., Krell 2003: 22-28; Fabbrini 2004: 89-90; McCartney 2004). Even though the engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq were pursued together with other countries, this was not due to U.S. interest in multilateral collaboration per se. Instead, teaming up was to serve an instrumental purpose by acquiring additional military personnel, intelligence, overflight rights, the use of local bases, and last, and arguably least, legitimacy (see, e.g., Longhurst 2004: 81). There were few signs that the U.S. government would take domestic political concerns of allied leaders into account (Holsti 2004: 255) or that the U.S. would have questioned its intention to invade Afghanistan or Iraq if there had been no allied support.¹¹ The American fight against terrorism thus showed strong tendencies toward unilateralism, with an emphasis on military action.

Even though the German government's declaration of "unlimited solidarity" with the U.S. following the attacks of September 11 was supported by most parties in the *Bundestag*, the pledge of a military contribution to the war in Afghanistan was intensely debated. Once again this debate was carried out less along partisan lines, but divided an anti-militarist and a more interventionist camp which consisted of members of different parties. The initial arguments of Chancellor Schröder and other supporters of the war were again premised on concepts of multilateralism and humanitarianism (Gießmann and Wagner 2009: 5; Meiers 2010: 210). On the one hand Germany was seen as bound by contract to participate (due to the *casus foederis* mechanism within the NATO treaty) and, on the other hand, the intervention was seen as legitimate given the UN mandate. Another important aspect of the framing of the Afghanistan mission was the combination of the military campaign with reconstruction and democratization efforts. Due to the reluctance among some of the members of parliament

¹¹ In that context one might also recall George W. Bush's famous statement: "You are with us, or with the terrorists" (Bush 2001). Likewise Krauthammer (2001: A29) even proposed that this new form of unilateralism "marks the real beginning of American post-Cold War foreign policy".

from the governing coalition Schröder even saw himself forced to link the vote on military measures against international terrorism (which included the deployment of German special forces for combat operations) to a parliamentary vote of confidence in order to secure the backing of his red-green coalition (Longhurst 2004: 82).¹² Despite attempts by the German government to keep regular German troops out of more intense armed hostilities, the *Bundeswehr* engagement intensified as the war progressed within an ISAF mandate which gradually evolved from peace keeping and reconstruction efforts to peace enforcement and counterinsurgency. Hence, German troops increasingly also participated in combat operations (e.g., Meiers 2010; Schreer 2012; Schröder 2014).

In this context one would assume American public opinion to be driven mainly by the general acceptance of the use of military force and internationalism, but not so much by multilateralism, while all three dispositions should be of relevance in the German case. In the United States the existential threat international terrorism was perceived to pose should override any concern for multilateral decision making. For German citizens, in contrast, the solidarity with the transatlantic ally can be expected to have played a decisive role in attitude formation. Given the high salience and low disagreement within and between countries, our model therefore predicts homogeneity of public opinion.

Yet soon after the war in Afghanistan had removed the Taliban from power and the engagement crossed over into an arduous stabilization and reconstruction phase, the U.S. government put Saddam Hussein's Iraq on the agenda of the War on Terror. The Bush administration started to increase pressure on Iraq over the course of 2002, accusing Saddam Hussein of developing weapons of mass destruction and collaborating with Islamic terrorists. The Democrats strongly criticized this aggressive policy and were unwilling to support what

¹² The Schröder administration tried to limit the German involvement in actual combat by agreeing to deploy troops only to the relatively stable northern part of Afghanistan and by imposing strict caveats on the rules of engagement for the German ISAF mission. The combat operations were conducted largely by German special forces under the OEF mandate. Not the least important motivation behind this separation of tasks was likely to keep the latter under the radar of public scrutiny.

seemed to them a Republican quest for another war without good reason, or rather without good evidence for the reasons they put forward (Holsti 2011). As early as in fall of 2002 President Bush made clear that the United States would move against Iraq even without a UN mandate and the support of some of its NATO allies, including Germany. The administration deemed a broad coalition of participating countries preferable but not necessary for military action. In contrast, the Democratic opposition valued multilateral support for any military engagement much higher. The justification the American government gave for the war was highly contested around the world and Germany, among other countries, refused open support. In what was considered a campaign move by many, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder took a strong stance against any military action against Iraq (e.g., Chu et al. 2006; Bierling 2014). The opposition parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) criticized this harsh refusal of German solidarity with the American ally, arguing that taking any option off the table would reduce the diplomatic pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with international demands.

Thus, while the case of Afghanistan did not lead to disagreement within NATO and was even backed by a UN mandate, the Iraq mission of the “coalition of the willing” led to considerable conflict between the United States and Germany. In this context then U.S. defense secretary Rumsfeld put forth the notion of Germany belonging to that “Old Europe” whose consent to U.S. policies now had become less important, given the newly admitted Eastern European NATO members’ willingness to support the invasion of Iraq. In parallel Chancellor Schröder suggested forming an axis from Paris via Berlin to Moscow in order to counter unilateral and war-mongering policies of the Bush administration (e.g., Levy et al. 2005).

Given such a contextual configuration our model predicts that militarism plays a role in both U.S. and German public opinion. In the U.S. multilateralism and internationalism may also have an impact on evaluations of Iraq policy. For the German public as a whole we do not expect this kind of effects. Rather, our model suggests differences in the way the postures are related to support in different subsections of the populace. Given the framing of the issue by

the respective party actors American Republicans and German Social Democratic and Green sympathizers should have been rather unconcerned with the preferences of the transatlantic ally. In contrast, American Democrats and German center-right conservatives should have cared for this aspect and consequently shown more similar opinion patterns. Because of the substantial salience of these conflicts these differences can be expected to have been rather distinct and to have radiated to other foreign and security topics of the time.

Altogether this brief demonstration of the operation of our model in four international conflicts in the post-Cold War era suggests that the war in Iraq differed considerably from the other cases. According to the line of reasoning developed above the fierce partisan debates that touched upon core foreign policy values might have led to an extension of disagreement from the foreign policy domain to a more general level, which in turn conveyed the impression of Germans and Americans living in two different worlds (Kagan 2003). The engagement of partisan actors in inter-state debates about the prudence of different policy principles might act as a catalyst to bring latent disagreement at the public level to the foreground. The above sketch suggests specifically for the German side that if humanitarianism and multilateralism cannot be forwarded as reasons for intervention Germans are reluctant to support military missions. Preemptive strikes, as contained in the post-9/11 American security doctrine, are clearly rejected. Instead Germans might once more be looking for a “German way” of international affairs, one which gives preference to diplomacy and multilateralism and goes a long way to avoid the use of military force (Longhurst 2004: 86). This way even might in some circumstances lead away from the transatlantic alliance – as in the case of Iraq or, more recently, the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya. Meanwhile in the United States the willingness to compromise with the European allies might have eroded at least in some parts of the American population, because multilateralism is seen not as an end in itself but as a means for generating legitimacy for the use of military force.

1.3 Data and outline of the book

We will examine these expectations concerning U.S.-German relations from a citizen perspective in the post-Cold War era in the remainder of the book. In our analyses we draw on data from surveys conducted among the German and American adult population between 1980 and 2010. Covering such a long period in comparative perspective implies strong requirements concerning the availability of data. In an ideal world for each point in time in both countries we would have valid and constant indicators for each concept. Then we could perform comparison both over time and in space and analyze each case properly. Given the long period of time we attempt to analyze we are forced to perform secondary analyses, however. This makes our world less than ideal and presents several challenges and limitations.

To begin with, there are not as many survey data as would be necessary to continuously study public opinion on foreign policy and transatlantic relations in the United States and Germany throughout the post-Cold War era. These topics were not widely and regularly covered by population surveys. This implies that we cannot cover each and every relevant topic to the same extent. Often we also have to deal with gaps when preparing time series for the analysis. In substantive terms this implies some limitations for the extent of our study.

For the analyses presented in the following pages we have combined data from different sources.¹³ Some of them stem from cross-sectional surveys repeated just a few times (such as, e.g., the *Welt der Deutschen im Wandel (WDD)* surveys held between 1992 and 1994 on behalf of the *German Marshall Fund*), whereas others come from repeated long-term cross-sectional data collection efforts. For the American case there are two such long-term study series available. One quadrennial series, conducted by the *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*

¹³ See Appendix A for a complete and more detailed description of all survey data used in this book.

(CCGA),¹⁴ covers not only the whole post-Cold War period but extends back to the 1980s (1982-2010). Additionally, data were utilized from the *PEW Foundation series America's Place in the World (APW)*, which started with two surveys in the 1990s (1993, 1997) and then covers the period from 2001 to 2009 with quadrennial polls. For Germany we can draw on a series of surveys commissioned by the *Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVG)* which spans the period from 1981 to 2007 with annual polls. A second series we utilize was annually surveyed for the *Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences (SOWI)*¹⁵ between 1997 and 2010. Finally we have available two comparative series with the *Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS)* conducted on behalf of the *German Marshall Fund* and *PEW's Global Attitudes Project (GAP)* in order to analyze public opinion in Germany and the United States on an annual basis between 2002 and 2011.

Data from these surveys do alleviate problems of over-time comparison somewhat but they do not guarantee comparability across countries. This latter problem is reduced by the data from the comparative TTS and GAP series, available for the years after 2001. Yet, even data from comparative series does not guarantee valid indicators for each and every concept in our analysis. We thus occasionally had to utilize second-best indicators that require careful interpretation. It goes without saying that comparing results from single-shot surveys usually raises even more severe issues. We have attempted to address such issues as openly as possible in analyzing data and interpreting results.

The inevitable secondary-analytic approach also brings along some insurmountable hurdles for data analysis that constrain the analyses to be presented. We shall address two which we consider particularly severe. To begin with, when exploring processes of opinion *formation* data from panel surveys are usually preferable. Yet there is virtually no panel data available dealing with opinions about foreign policy. We thus had to rely on trend data that do not

¹⁴ The organization was founded as the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CCFR) and changed its name in 2006.

¹⁵ In 2013 SOWI was merged into the *Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw)*.

permit to analyze opinion formation at the individual level in a strict sense. Secondly, when addressing the role of elite communication we rely on descriptions of public debates and discourse, rather than on data from content analyses. In some cases this might probably hurt the analytical rigor of the analysis.¹⁶ Yet, as our arguments refer to elite debates in rather broad terms we are confident that this decision (which was inevitable due to budgetary restrictions within our research project) does not bias the majority of our findings.

The results of the analyses based on these data will be presented in the two following chapters. In the second chapter we will rely on trend data from multiple surveys to examine implications of our model first for core postures, then for perceptions of the international system (including evaluations of transatlantic relations), and, finally, for policy evaluations. The model suggests that Americans and Germans differ in core postures as far as militarism and unilateralism are concerned. We do not expect considerable differences in internationalism. Following this line of reasoning we expect similar perceptions of the international system to emerge in the absence of value-based disagreement. In contrast, in times of value-based conflict over the use of military force or unilateral action, U.S. and German citizens will diverge in how they perceive the international environment and be more critical of each other and of transatlantic relations. We expect similarities in citizens' evaluations of policies if only internationalism is invoked. However, U.S. and German publics are anticipated to respond differently to policies and events that are tied to unilateralism and the use of military force.

In the third chapter we turn to analyzing the dynamics of public opinion on foreign policy in more depth. In particular we aim at shedding more light on the role of political parties in shaping public opinion. As the use of military force plays such an important role in transatlantic relations we have picked cases concerning its use. The selected cases, however, differ on three dimensions that also are prominent in our model. First, we chose cases in

¹⁶ As a second-best strategy using data from elite surveys might have been an option. However, a lack of suitable data did not permit to pursue this any further.

which parties within societies (widely) agreed or (widely) disagreed. Second, we selected cases of agreement and disagreement between the U.S. and German governments. Finally, cases vary with regard to the salience disagreements had in the political debates about the respective issue. By studying these cases in depth we aim at a better understanding of the interplay of core postures, domestic politics, and international relations in affecting public opinion on foreign policy in the United States and Germany after the Cold War.

Chapter 4 then sums up the argument and draws conclusions. As the empirical analysis uncovers rather stable patterns of agreement and disagreement regarding core policy postures, which also are transmitted to the evaluation of specific policy issues, several expectations can be derived about the future of U.S.-German relations. As events from the more recent past show, such as the so-called NSA scandal and the drawn-out negotiations about a free-trade agreement (TTIP), harmony and conflict in the two publics' relationships are likely to remain driven by their core postures on foreign policy (and other domains).