Online Appendix to

Fabian Endres, Matthias Mader, Harald Schoen (2015): On the relationship between strategic cultures and support for European defence: A comment on Irondelle, Mérand and Foucault, *European Journal of Political Research.*

Question wording

Militarism: For each of the following, please tell me if you think it is one of the role of the army, or not. – Preparing for wars and fighting.

Humanitarian internationalism: For each of the following, please tell me if you think it is one of the role of the army, or not. – Helping other countries in case of natural, ecological or nuclear disaster, or combating famine, or clearing minefields, etc.

European defence: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it. – The European Union member states should have a common defence and security policy.

Project EU power: I am going to read out a list of actions that the European Union could undertake. For each one, please tell me, if in your opinion, it should be a priority, or not? – Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world.

Defend EU territory: The European Union has decided to put in place a common security and defence policy. Which role do you think a European army should have? – Defending the territory of the European Union, including (OUR COUNTRY).

Intervene in other parts of the world: The European Union has decided to put in place a common security and defence policy. Which role do you think a European army should have? – Intervening in conflicts in other parts of the world.

Intervene in conflicts at EU borders: The European Union has decided to put in place a common security and defence policy. Which role do you think a European army should have? – Intervening in conflicts at the borders of the European Union.

Carry out humanitarian mission: The European Union has decided to put in place a common security and defence policy. Which role do you think a European army should have? – Carrying out humanitarian missions.

Exclusive national identity: In the near future do you see yourself as …? [NATIONALITY] only; [NATIONALITY] and European; European and [NATIONALITY]; European only.

Threat world war: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? – A world war.

Threat conventional war: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? – A conventional war in Europe (not nuclear, bacteriological or nuclear).

Threat terrorism: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? – Terrorism

Threat nuclear proliferation: Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally, you are afraid of it, or not? – Spread of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Education: How old were you when you stopped full-time education?

Gender: [filled by interviewer]

Age: How old are you?

Ideology: In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?

Descriptive Statistics

Below are the frequencies of the variables used in the analyses. "Don't knows" have been treated as missing values (the same is true for "Army of no use"; but see Table A6 below for an examination of the effects of this category on attitudes toward European defence and Petersberg tasks). Results remain substantially unaltered if the number of cases is significantly increased by omitting ideology from the models. The "European, too" category of the exclusive national identity variable comprises citizens who see themselves as "[national] and European", "European and [national]", and "European only". Pupils and students were assigned to the three education categories according to their age, "don't know" answers were treated as low education.

Table A1: Overview over the frequencies of the dependent and independent variables

	For	Against	Don't know	
European defence	69.8	18.6	11.7	
	Priority	Not a priority	Don't know	
Project EU power	49.3	38.4	12.4	
	Mentioned	Not mentioned		
Defend EU territory	69.1	30.9		
Intervene in conflicts at the EU border	45.5	54.5		
Intervene in conflicts in other parts of the world	82.2	17.8		
Carrying out humanitarian missions	45.5	54.5		
	Yes	No	Don't know	Army of no use
Humanitarian internationalism	78.7	10.3	5.2	5.8
Militarism	68.6	21.4	4.1	5.8
	National only	European, too	Don't know	
Exclusive national identity	42.4	54.5	3.1	
	Afraid	Not afraid	Don't know	
Threat world war	45.7	52.0	2.4	
Threat conventional war	45.6	50.0	4.4	
Threat terrorism	71.6	25.8	2.6	
Threat nuclear proliferation	60.6	35.3	4.1	
	Low	Middle	High	
Education	33.2	42.5	24.4	
	Male	Female		
Gender	48.3	51.7		
	Mean (in years)	Std. Dev.		
Age	44.6	17.9		
	Mean (from 0-left to 9-right)	Std. Dev.	Refused	Don't know
Ideology	4.2	2.0	9.9	11.3

Reported are percentages of categorical variables and means of metric variables. N=16,067.

According to our operationalization of strategic postures, Europeans were predominantly militaristic and almost unanimously humanitarian internationalists in their foreign policy postures. Therefore, two thirds of the Europeans were in favour of the use of military means in international affairs *and* the pursuing of humanitarian goals, while non-militarist isolationists were hardly to be found at all. However, we have some doubts whether these numbers really depict the degree of militarist and humanitarian sentiments in the European population. Instead, these high approval rates are probably an artefact of the question design. Forced to choose between the dichotomy of "yes" and "no" for a wide range of possible army tasks, the presumably large number of ambivalent citizens probably tended to approve. If a scale with more response options had been available, many respondents would have probably avoided the extreme categories, leading to lower support for militarist and humanitarian army tasks. These deficiencies notwithstanding, we think that the overarching research question whether strategic cultures principally matter can be answered with these two items, while a more nuanced question design would lead to even more pronounced effects of strategic cultures.

Table A2: Overview over independent variables

		Role of the army: Helping other countries in case of natural, ecological or nuclear disasters, or combating famine, or clearing minefields, etc. (Humanitarian internationalism)		
		no	yes	
Role of the army: Preparing for wars and fighting (Militarism)	no	503 3.6%	2,822 20.3%	3,325 23.9%
	yes	1,111 8.0%	9,492 68.2%	10,603 76.1%
		1,614 11.6%	12,314 88.4%	13,928 100%

Determinants of attitudes towards European defence and Petersberg tasks

Below are the complete regression results of the replication analyses discussed in the main text. The marginal probability changes reported in Table 1 in the main text are calculated from these results.

Table A3: Explaining attitudes towards European defence and Petersberg tasks (logistic regressions)

	European defence	Projection	Defence	Border	Intervention	Humanitarian
Humanitarian Internationalism	0.45***	0.51***	0.32***	0.24*	0.77***	0.91***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.06)
Militarism	0.22	0.38**	0.38**	0.16	0.29**	-0.10
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Exclusive National Identity	-1.16***	-0.38***	-0.43***	-0.30**	-0.12	-0.36***
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Threat World War	0.21**	0.23*	-0.07	-0.25*	0.06	-0.13
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Threat Conventional War	-0.12	0.08	-0.04	-0.08	-0.05	-0.12
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Threat Terrorism	0.20**	0.07	0.27*	0.08	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Threat Nuclear Proliferation	0.23*	0.13	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.16
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Age	0.00	0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.11	-0.19**	-0.24***	-0.09	-0.03	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Education: medium	-0.00	-0.19**	0.16*	0.18*	-0.08	0.23***
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Education: high	-0.31	-0.38**	0.13	0.38***	0.16	0.42***
	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Ideology (right)	0.20	-0.09	0.08	0.24	0.07	-0.33*
	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.15)
Ideology squared	-1.37**	0.46	0.33	-0.61	-0.27	-0.38
	(0.53)	(0.61)	(0.85)	(0.75)	(1.02)	(0.50)
Constant	1.31***	-0.28*	0.55*	-0.19	-2.31***	-0.69***
	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.10)
No. of Cases	9056	9056	9056	9056	9056	9056
Adj. McFadden's R²	0.063	0.030	0.017	0.013	0.017	0.027

Notes: Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients b with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Weighted by sociodemographic characteristics and household size, assuming equal country sizes (West and East Germany are treated as separate countries).

The following table reports the results of regression models which we refer to in footnote 9, in which interaction terms of the strategic postures are included to check for multiplicative effects.

Table A4: Interaction effects between militarism and humanitarian internationalism in explaining attitudes towards European defence and Petersberg tasks (logistic regressions)

	European Defence	Projection	Defence	Border	Intervention	Humanitarian
Humanitarian Internationalism	0.36	0.22	0.28	0.59***	0.44	1.07***
	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.10)
Militarism	0.11	0.02	0.34	0.60***	-0.13	0.10
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.32)	(0.11)
Hum. Internat. x Militarism	0.13	0.41**	0.05	-0.50**	0.46	-0.23
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.32)	(0.13)
Exclusive National Identity	-1.16***	-0.38***	-0.43***	-0.30**	-0.13	-0.36***
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Threat World War	0.21**	0.23*	-0.07	-0.25*	0.05	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Threat Conventional War	-0.12	0.08	-0.04	-0.08	-0.05	-0.12
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Threat Terrorism	0.20**	0.07	0.27*	0.08	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Threat Nuclear Proliferation	0.23*	0.13	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.16
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Age	0.00	0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.11	-0.19**	-0.24***	-0.10	-0.03	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Education: medium	-0.00	-0.19**	0.16*	0.17*	-0.07	0.22***
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Education: high	-0.30	-0.38**	0.13	0.37***	0.16	0.42***
	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Ideology (right)	0.20	-0.10	0.08	0.24	0.07	-0.33*
	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.15)
Ideology squared	-1.37*	0.46	0.34	-0.62	-0.26	-0.39
	(0.53)	(0.61)	(0.85)	(0.74)	(1.02)	(0.50)
Constant	1.38***	-0.03	0.58*	-0.49*	-2.01***	-0.82***
	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.11)
No. of Cases	9056	9056	9056	9056	9056	9056
Adj. McFadden's R²	0.063	0.030	0.017	0.014	0.017	0.027

Notes: Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients b with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Weighted by sociodemographic characteristics and household size, assuming equal country sizes (West and East Germany are treated as separate countries).

The marginal probability changes displayed in Figure 1 in the main text are calculated from the regression models reported below.

Table A5: Interaction effects between strategic postures and exclusive national identities in explaining attitudes toward European defence and Petersberg tasks (logistic regressions)

	European defence	Projection	Defence	Border	Intervention	Humanitarian
Humanitarian Internationalism	0.49*	0.50***	0.22	0.29*	0.77***	0.76***
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.09)
Militarism	0.13	0.41**	0.49**	0.26**	0.41***	-0.14
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Exclusive National Identity	-1.23***	-0.32	-0.39*	-0.00	0.14	-0.76***
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Hum. Internat. x Excl. Nat. Identity	-0.07	0.02	0.19	-0.11	0.01	0.36*
	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.18)
Militarism x. Excl. Nat. Identity	0.18	-0.10	-0.28*	-0.27**	-0.36**	0.10
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Threat World War	0.21**	0.23*	-0.06	-0.25*	0.06	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Threat Conventional War	-0.12	0.07	-0.05	-0.09	-0.06	-0.12*
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Threat Terrorism	0.20**	0.07	0.27*	0.08	-0.08	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Threat Nuclear Proliferation	0.23*	0.13	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.16
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Age	0.00	0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.11	-0.19**	-0.24***	-0.09	-0.02	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Education: medium	-0.01	-0.19**	0.16*	0.18*	-0.07	0.23***
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Education: high	-0.31	-0.38**	0.13	0.38***	0.16	0.43***
	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Ideology (right)	0.21	-0.09	0.08	0.24	0.07	-0.33*
	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.15)
Ideology squared	-1.37**	0.46	0.34	-0.60	-0.26	-0.39
	(0.53)	(0.61)	(0.84)	(0.74)	(1.02)	(0.51)
Constant	1.34***	-0.30	0.56*	-0.31	-2.40***	-0.52***
	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.13)
No. of Cases	9056	9056	9056	9056	9056	9056
Adj. McFadden's R²	0.063	0.030	0.018	0.014	0.017	0.028

Notes: Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients b with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Weighted by sociodemographic characteristics and household size, assuming equal country sizes (West and East Germany are treated as separate countries).

Spontaneous statements that the army is of no use and the measurement of militarism and humanitarian internationalism

Coding the independent variables of humanitarian internationalism and militarism, we followed Irondelle et al. (2015) by considering only those cases which indicated whether they were in favour of a specific army role or not. However, about six percent of the respondents refused to take a look at the list of possible army roles and spontaneously stated that the army is of no use at all. This proportion of citizens regarding the army as completely unnecessary varied considerably between countries: from less than two percent in Greece, Italy, Spain or Portugal to more than ten percent in Sweden, France, Finland or Luxembourg. It is difficult to judge whether substantive differences between the countries led to these results or whether they reflect methods effects, e.g. due to different handling of these spontaneous responses by the polling firms. While it may seem natural to consider these respondents as pacifists (by assigning them a zero on our militarism dimension), things are more complicated with regard to the humanitarian internationalism dimension. To gauge the empirical relevance of this group, we entered a dummy indicator into the regression which identifies the respondents who thought the army was of no use. The results below suggest that these respondents might have approved some of the army roles, especially the humanitarian ones, had they taken a look at them. Citizens who stated that the army was of no use were by about ten percentage points more probable to support carrying out humanitarian missions or intervening in conflicts in other parts of the world, compared to respondents who objected to humanitarian and militarist army tasks. Furthermore, with a probability of 60 percent they were equally likely as militarist humanitarians to support the projection of EU power, compared to a probability of 40 percent among respondents who objected to both militarist and humanitarian tasks. These results suggest that these people indeed considered the EU as a non-militarist actor in world affairs at first hand. However, issues which refer directly to the military, like the establishing of a common security and defence policy, the defending of the EU territory or intervening in conflicts at the borders of the EU, like in the Kosovo war one year before, met their objection, resulting in lower approval rates comparable to non-militarists and non-humanitarian internationalists.

Table A6: Effects of spontaneous "army is of no use"-mentions in explaining attitudes towards European defence and Petersberg tasks (logistic regressions)

	European Defence	Projection	Defence	Border	Intervention	Humanitarian
Humanitarian Internationalism	0.45***	0.51***	0.32***	0.24*	0.76***	0.91***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.06)
Militarism	0.22	0.37**	0.38**	0.16	0.29**	-0.11
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Army of no use (spontaneous)	0.20	0.89***	-0.06	-0.02	1.12***	0.36**
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Exclusive National Identity	-1.15***	-0.38***	-0.40***	-0.28**	-0.10	-0.34***
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Threat World War	0.21**	0.24*	-0.08	-0.26**	0.05	-0.13
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Threat Conventional War	-0.15	0.07	-0.01	-0.09	-0.06	-0.12
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Threat Terrorism	0.22**	0.09	0.26*	0.08	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Threat Nuclear Proliferation	0.23**	0.14	0.04	0.09	0.11	0.18
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Age	0.00	0.01***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	-0.13*	-0.17*	-0.23***	-0.09	-0.04	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Education: medium	-0.01	-0.20**	0.14	0.16*	-0.10	0.22***
	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Education: high	-0.35	-0.40**	0.10	0.36***	0.12	0.41***
	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Ideology (right)	0.13	-0.11	0.11	0.25	0.02	-0.32*
	(0.35)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.14)
Ideology squared	-1.42**	0.15	0.04	-0.75	-0.48	-0.62
	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.76)	(0.71)	(1.00)	(0.50)
Constant	1.34***	-0.27*	0.56*	-0.19	-2.30***	-0.69***
	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.09)
No. of Cases	9581	9581	9581	9581	9581	9581
Adj. McFadden's R^2	0.064	0.030	0.019	0.014	0.015	0.027

Notes: Entries are unstandardized logistic regression coefficients b with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Levels of significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
Weighted by sociodemographic characteristics and household size, assuming equal country sizes (West and East Germany are treated as separate countries).