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From Intergovernmentalism to Party Politics ?
An Institutional Power Analysis of European
Multi-Chamber Legislation from 1958 to 1995

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ABSTRACT

The complex feature of European legislation - the combination of differences concerning the actors, the decision rules and the institutional settings for European bodies, which are linked by different procedural rules - is based on a simultaneous internal and inter-institutional coalition problem which is reflected by the European multi-chamber regime structure. The internal coalition problem of European politics refers to the competing interests of the Member States in the Council and - in some cases - of national party delegations in European Parliament which are counterbalanced by the Commission. Due to the variation in the participation and decision rules in European legislation, the actors involved have different formal voting power positions from which to influence decision making. Since the foundation of the European Communities in 1958, modifications of the institutional framework, either by Treaty reforms or by the accession of new Member States have changed the voting power distribution. Our chronological analysis throws light on intergovernmental or supranational tendencies as well as on party politics in European legislation. Our results indicate a future institutional framework of Policy Domain Bicameralism in European legislation.

1. The Internal and Inter-Institutional Coalition Problem of European Politics

The European Parliament is one of the most peculiar and fascinating parliaments. Although the European Parliament has a strong position in European budgetary politics, it is widely considered to be a weak parliament as far as its role in the passage of regular European legislation is concerned (Lodge 1989, Wessels 1991, Ludlow 1991). However, the most recent institutional reforms of European politics indicate a stepwise integration of the European Parliament in European multi-chamber legislation (Jacobs and Corbett 1990: 6,7). Since the coming into force of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the European Parliament under cooperation procedure has gained an important power of having the potential to act as a conditional agenda setter (Tsebelis 1994: 128). Moreover, the introduction of the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) of 1993 has increased the parliamentary legislative power position even further.

The integration of the European Parliament in European politics abounds from the transfer of legislative competences at the supranational level. The continuous process of a supranationalisation of sensitive policy areas in complex European politics has given rise to the concern about how to provide democratic stability for European legislation. This is countered by two lines of argument: First, a re-nationalisation on the subsidiary principle, which promotes decision making at the national or regional level. Secondly, a strengthening of the European Parliament in European multi-chamber decision making, which may offset the charge of bureaucratic European supranationalism. Looked at from this angle, the first direct elections of European Parliament in 1979 prepared the way for the supranational transfer of material competences set for the SEA in 1987.

In the past, the supranational transfer of legislative competences dominated the discussion on European integration (Wallace 1982: 67), whereas the issue of complex European legislation tended to be simplified: It was either reduced to the internal coalition problem of a single chamber, i.e. the coalition problem within the Council (Rogowski 1975, Brams 1976), or trivialised the importance of the inter-institutional relations between those European bodies involved in the passage of legislation, i.e. by the assumption of a unitary parliamentary actor (Tsebelis 1994: 138). In contrast to this, we will distinguish between collective and corporate actors whose power positions refer to simultaneous internal and inter-institutional coalition problems in European multi-chamber legislation.

Corporate power denotes the individual power share of an acting entity, whereas collective power expresses the relative chamber power, i.e. the summed power share of the Council's

members for instance, or, if necessary, that of the acting units of the European Parliament. In the case of the Commission, collective and corporate power are identical as the Commission acts as a unitary actor in the passage of European legislation. The simple distinction between corporate and collective power being made here mainly serves to indicate that our study of European multi-chamber legislation is an advance on former analyses. This study will take into account the complex coalition problem of those actors who really play a role in the passage of European legislation.

In addition, rather than using a substantial power concept for the central European bodies, we examine the power distribution between European authorities on the logic of material European decision making. This logic defines a simultaneous internal and inter-institutional coalition problem which subjects a European bill to reaching the inter-institutional consent of the Commission, the Council and, in some cases, also the European Parliament. The inter-institutional coalition problem of European decision making consists of the interaction of European bodies that function according to quite different rules. Here, the procedural rules define the varying set of participating actors, all with formal voting rights, and there are three different European procedures in play: the standard consultation procedure, the cooperation procedure or the co-decision procedure each with various combinations of European actors participating.

Figure 1 about here

Despite the varying set of actors, the different types of voting requirements set limits to the internal majority building within each collective European actor. Unanimity, qualified and absolute majority of collective European actors set different institutional winning prerequisites, which may again vary during the course of each specific legislative procedure. In the context of the Council's majority prerequisite, the reason for unanimity is twofold: Firstly, constitutional unanimity is required in terms of a Member State's particular saliency on a sensitive European policy area. In this respect, unanimity of the Council of Ministers is either defined by procedural rules for this specific sensitive policy area or a Member State makes use of the claim to its "vital" interests, which goes back to the "Luxembourg compromise" of 1966. A second reason for unanimity is related to the Council's role in European decision making. In this case, operational unanimity is also required when a proactive Council wishes to amend a Commission proposal. Besides this, due to the inter-institutional relation of European bodies, proactivism of the Council's Member States can also be initiated by the procedural linkage with

the European Parliament. Parliamentary activity itself is based on an internal two-stage coalition problem: first, national party delegations form parliamentary groups and, second, these parliamentary groups form coalitions to overcome the absolute majority criterion.

A policy-specific acceleration of European decision making process was intended by allowing a reactive Council to also decide by majority vote. Here, the inter-institutional coalition problem under the standard consultation procedure is defined on majority building within the Commission and within the Council, whilst, in the cooperation and co-decision procedures, the European Parliament is also involved in the process of European decision making. This complex feature of European politics - the combination of different types of authorities, different types of decision rules and different institutional settings for European bodies, which are linked by different procedural rules - provoked criticism on the modest transparency of European legislation. This critique became particularly apparent when the Maastricht reforms of the institutional framework transformed the European Community from a mainly economic to a far more political institution, the European Union. The formation of a political union has deepened the discussion on supranational or intergovernmental tendencies in European legislation (Cameron 1992: 66). The important normative question of a democratic power distribution between European authorities that emerged as a result has to be answered. It is to this question that this study turns and presents an appropriate method for evaluating the power shares of European actors and their modifications in the past.

2. The Concepts of Multi-Chamber Analysis: Coalition Power and Actors

As a result of the simultaneous inter-institutional and internal coalition problems, the final adoption of a legislative proposal is highly vulnerable in European multi-chamber politics. European legislation is very susceptible to blockage, but the veto positions of the various European actors differ significantly. Due to the variation in the participation and decision rules in European legislation, the involved actors have different formal possibilities of influencing decision making. We interpreted these possibilities as formal power shares in terms of Weber's power concept, which defines power as the possibility to impose one's position (Weber 1972: 28). The combination of participation and decision rules then generates another problem: If majority building of European actors depends on a simultaneous inter-institutional and internal coalition problem, how can we analyse the different possibilities open to European actors in

such a way as to be able to compare the individual as well as collective power shares in European multi-chamber legislation ?

Our solution is a game-theoretical power index which appropriately reflects the simultaneous coalition problems of multi-chamber systems. In the past, power indices were exclusively applied to the analysis of internal European coalition problems. These studies pointed out some "paradoxes" of institutional modifications by Treaty reforms. (Rogowski 1975, Brams 1975, Brams and Affuso 1976). One shortcoming of these single chamber analyses, however, is that the application of a specific index is based rather more on the plausibility of its empirical results than on its concept of theoretical coalition power. Compared to a single-chamber analysis, the simultaneous coalition problem of a multi-chamber system complicates our study. Such approach makes severe demand on a power concept, and so the selection of an appropriate power index becomes less arbitrary.

After the first game-theoretical analysis of a multi-chamber system was presented by Shapley and Shubik (1954), the subsequent and ever-growing number of game-theoretical methods has become more of a burden than a blessing. Because all methods are highly susceptible to the concept of the actors to which they are applied, we have to be very careful when taking the distinction between the different types of actors into account. With respect to the institutional linkage of both types of actors, i.e. the individual unweighted and the corporate weighted multi-chamber actor, ordinary methods prove inappropriate for the calculation of inter-institutional voting power (König and Bräuninger 1995). The relative share of seats, i.e. in the Council or in the European Parliament, does not really throw much light on their inter-institutional power relationship. Moreover, we reject game-theoretical concepts such as the Deegan and Packel index (1980) and the Public Good index (Holler and Packel 1983) as both concepts cannot rule out the possibility of cases arising where actors with a higher weight of votes may have lower power values than actors with a lower weight of votes. Other indices, like the Coleman index (1971) and the Johnston index (1977), are merely linear transformations of the Banzhaf index (Brams and Affuso 1976: 33). Beyond these indices, the axiomatic concepts of the normalized Banzhaf (1965) and Shapley (1953) remain as applicable in the analysis of formal power in multi-chamber legislation (Nurmi 1987: 186). Despite some theoretical parallels between the Shapley and the Banzhaf index, the normalised version of the latter is based upon another coalition concept that we have to consider for the analysis of multi-chamber legislation (Dubey and Shapley 1979: 102). Indeed, both power indices may produce different results, and a convincing criterion is needed to prefer the one to the other. The common axiomatic basis of both indices is that:

- first, an actor who solely overcomes the majority criterion by his own weight of votes is called a dictator with all voting power, whereas an actor who fails to contribute to majority building, as he has only few, or even no votes, is regarded as a dummy player with no voting power;
- second, a permutation of the actors' voting sequences leaves the actors power shares unchanged (Owen 1982: 193, 216).

Leaving aside the formal axiomatic property of "joint efficiency" (Harsanyi 1977: 215), a more important aspect of both indices concerns their different concepts of coalition power. Since the Banzhaf index permits several critical positions in a single winning coalition, the additivity of probable critical positions has to be called into question, and in particular for multi-chamber systems (Dubey and Shapley 1979: 103). In this respect, the normalised Banzhaf index does not refer to an actor's probability of being pivotal for any coalition, but to an actor's probability of being critical in relation to the amount of all critical defections. The result is that highly vulnerable winning coalitions become more important than those winning coalitions that are only made vulnerable by a few or even a single actor (Straffin 1977: 109). For these reasons, we reject the Banzhaf concept of relative critical defections for the power analysis of multi-chamber legislation with highly different institutional settings for the chambers involved, i.e. the different membership sizes of the Council and the European Parliament (Shelley 1986: 260). Due to the larger membership size, the relative critical defections of the European Parliament increase significantly so that the Banzhaf index overestimates its collective chamber power.

Compared to the Banzhaf index, the Shapley index takes into account all n -faculty voting sequences and checks how often each actor is able to transform a losing coalition into a winning coalition. For each actor, the share of pivotal positions is the formal voting power. Since each voting sequence has only one pivotal position, the sum of all Shapley indices is equal to the total probability of a situation, which corresponds to the whole procedure of European legislation. Thus, the individual Shapley power may be summed up for each chamber and collectively compared (König and Bräuninger 1995).

Apart from the theoretical and methodological problems of a multi-chamber analysis, most European game-theoretical studies suffer from the assumption, either explicitly or implicitly, of a consistent European party cleavage. The questionability of this assumption becomes evident when the European parliamentary party groups are regarded as the acting units of the European Parliament and are provided with homogeneous shares of votes (see e.g. Holler and Kellermann 1978, Bomsdorf 1980). In contrast to this, we will point out a second "national"

dimension of the European Parliament, which takes the different national party systems into consideration. The internal parliamentary coalition problem is based on a two-stage majority building process in which the national party delegations are the acting units of the European Parliament.

In a first step, national party delegations join in coalitions with their European party allies. It is important that we refer to the parliamentary groups as "coalitions". These European parliamentary groups are collective actors and were not provided with homogeneous voting power shares. Concerning this first step of parliamentary coalition building, the more traditional parties are privileged by the internal rules of the European Parliament. European parliamentary groups have to be founded by at least 26 members from one Member State, by 21 members from two Member States, by 16 members from three and by only 13 members of four and more Member States. Although the membership in parliamentary groups is supported by the funding of group staff and by the election of parliamentary office-holders, the legislative pivotal power is still based on the national party delegations in the European Parliament.

Up to now, European parliamentary party groups have had to form further majority coalitions to participate in European legislation. In this sense, the range of each European parliamentary group determines the possibilities of its national party delegations being pivotal, should a European parliamentary group be able to overcome the absolute majority criterion by a coalition. According to the internal European parliamentary party group configuration and their relative share of parliamentary seats, national party delegations can have a position of either a dummy player or a dictator. This concept outlines the differences between members of parliamentary groups and independent national party delegations which have power if they are pivotal in any voting sequence of European parliamentary majority building. Whereas the blocking possibilities of independents are not limited to the scope of party allies, members of parliamentary groups depend on the strength of their parliamentary group, i.e. the French Socialist are only pivotal in the scope of the Socialist parliamentary group (SOC) if the socialist parliamentary group is able to transform a losing coalition into a winning coalition in Parliament.

If one accepts our interpretation, the two-step power of European parliamentary actors is comparable to an internal multi-chamber situation within the European Parliament, so that the power shares of national party delegations can be summed up as the collective power share of the parliamentary groups. The parliamentary subgame is regarded as a two-step coalition problem from national parliamentary delegations to majority coalitions of two or more European parliamentary party groups.

For some procedural rules, the subgame of the Council of Ministers offers a distinction between a proactive and a reactive role of the Member States, which depends on the possibility of a qualified majority vote within Council. The supranational veto player, the European Commission, counterbalances both internal subgames, either the intergovernmental coalition problem within the Council or the party coalition problem within the European Parliament. The supranational Commission itself amalgamates both a proactive and a reactive role. Due to its sole right of initiative for legislative proposals, the Commission is the proactive agenda setter. The supranational character of European legislation is still guaranteed by the Commission's right to mediate between the competing claims of other European actors, and its right to suspend collective decisions before publication in the Official Journal.

Having presented our concepts on coalition power and actors, the next step is the analysis of the simultaneous coalition problem. In this respect, we will ask whether the institutional modifications of European participation and decision rules, which change the power distribution between European actors, indicate an institutional tendency toward either supranationalism, intergovernmentalism or party politics. These tendencies express the regime cleavage of European decision making by the power distribution between European actors as a result of the procedural participation and decision rights.

Our chronological view reveals two different forms of institutional modifications. First, the Treaty reforms following Rome or Maastricht, for instance, which lay down constitutional participation and decision rules. Secondly, the enlargements following the accession of new members modify the internal coalition problem of European multi-chamber legislation.

Here, a development towards intergovernmentalism brings with it a power increase for the Member States in European legislation which stresses the tensions within the Council: its members are merely delegates of the Member States, voting on the instructions of their government, whereas a supranational tendency relies on a powerful Commission to confine the national character of European legislation (Weiler 1981: 271-73). Another question concerns the party political dimension in European politics should the European Parliament really take on a powerful position after the last institutional reforms. In this respect, the discussions on the democratic deficit of European legislation have already widened the regime cleavage of European decision making to party politics. We will outline the development of European politics by the power distribution between European actors with regard to the different procedural rules for the passing of European legislation.

3. From Intergovernmental Unanimity to Reactive Supranationalism

Since the foundation of the European Communities, European legislation has been characterised by a bicameral inter-institutional coalition problem of the Commission and the members of the Council of Ministers. According to the EEC and Euratom Treaties, which entered into force in 1958, the Council was only obliged to consult the European Parliament on Commission proposals before their adoption. For the standard procedure of consultation, no matter how extensive the parliamentary possibilities of being involved in the discussion of European legislation, the bottom line of being able to block or to impose parliamentary will on both central European bodies is lacking (Jacobs and Corbett 1990: 164).

The linkage of both central European bodies passes through all European procedures. In this respect, we concentrate on the mechanisms of European decision making, since the procedural steps have already been exhaustively presented by Kapteyn and Verloren Van Themaat (1990). The Commission initiates, and the members of the Council adopt a proposal, which can still be vetoed by the supranational Commission before publication in the Official Journal. Indeed, the Commission (and not the members of the European Parliament) accompanies the conciliation of a proposal within the Council. The suspensive veto of the Commission is, consequently, directly linked to unanimous decision making within the Council. We will outline two reasons as to why this should be.

3.1 International or Proactive Unanimity in Council Decision Making

Unanimity is the most convenient decision making rule in international cooperation. Since the sovereignty of national states is the basic matter at stake in any form of international cooperation, unanimity formally guarantees the mediation of all national interests (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). In the event of unanimity amongst all participants, it is very easy to determine the collective voting power of the Commission and of the members of the Council. In this instance, each participant is able to block a unanimous collective decision, and so, the veto right of each participant reduces the set of winning sets to a single unanimous winning coalition. Due to this limitation, unanimity is often called a minority rule but we instead will distinguish between a proactive and a blocking power of the Member States (McClosky 1949: 637-654).

In the case of unanimity, voting power is equally shared with regard to the number of actors, that is, the Commission and the members of the Council. In principle, the Commission refers to the college of 20 Commissioners responsible for the General Directorates. Similar to the division of labour in national governments, each Commissioner is provided with his own portfolio in particular policy areas and, thus, carries the main leadership responsibility. Once a Commission proposal is prepared, its negotiation is safeguarded from a General Directorate, so that we can conceptualize the Commission as an unitary actor in European legislation.

As a consequence, since 1995 sixteen actors have to be taken into account in the case of unanimity: the present fifteen members of the Council and the Commissioner responsible for a policy proposal. Due to the accession of new Member States, a unanimous Council has been able to strengthen its collective voting power in European legislation as the following results illustrate.

Table 1, first column about here

When the Treaties of Rome were signed in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the collective voting power of the unanimous six-member Council was about 86% in bicameral legislation. After the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1972, the collective voting power of a unanimous nine-member Council increased to 90%. The enlargement by Greece as the 10th Member State in 1981 and the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 strengthened yet again the power position of the new twelve Member States in relation to the Commission's power share. Since the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1994, the power of a unanimous Council of Ministers has been raised even further to more than 93%.

For most sensitive European policy areas, unanimity of Council members is required. The formal obligation of a unanimous adoption is still an indicator of the international character of some areas of European legislation. However, abstention by members who are present or represented does not prevent a decision from being adopted unanimously. This improvement became apparent in May 1982, when, for the first time in the history of European legislation, the Council adopted agricultural prices with Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom abstaining.

Another type of unanimity emerges when the Council wishes to modify a proposal that could be approved by a majority. In these cases, we can distinguish between a proactive and a reactive role of Council members. If a majority is required, a proactive role of the members of

the Council means that the Member States must modify a Commission proposal by unanimous vote. In principle, the institutional problem of a unanimous modification right is its transformation into a right of initiative. Once this proactive role of a unanimous Council moves into a right to initiate proposals, the Commission can veto a unanimous adoption of a modified proposal as long as the proposal has not yet been published in the Official Journal of European Law. Nevertheless, the power distribution between the Commission and the Council is not affected by the international or proactive type of unanimity, and so, today, the Commission is provided with 1/16 of total bicameral voting power. So, if the Member States can agree consensually, their unity is a strength. This holds true if we accept that a veto by any participant will block the adoption of a bicameral proposal.

The important aspect here is that the rise from majority requirement to unanimity reveals the logic of European integration: No European supranationalism exists beyond a unanimous vote of the Member States. Accordingly, majority voting still presupposes the passive consent of all Member States to a Commission proposal. Of all passive members because each Member State can always lay claim to a "vital" interest that at least postpones a majority decision. In this context, majority votes depend on a reactive role of the members of the Council which will affect the bicameral power distribution in European politics.

3.2 The Simple Reactive Majority - Regular European Decision Rule out of Use

Compared to unanimity, majority rule may increase the number of winning sets by the eventual exclusion of some reactive Council members. In the case of unanimity, the combinations of majority building are limited to a single minimum winning coalition. Each participant is able to block a unanimous collective decision reducing the set of winning sets to a single unanimous winning coalition. According to European procedural rules, majority voting can be applied to the adoption of a Commission proposal with regard to a reactive role of the Member States. The reactive role of the Member States generates a second question: How is the inter-institutional power relationship of both central European bodies affected, if a unanimous Commission has to deal with a reactive Council ?

This question reflects the theoretical problem of different institutional winning prerequisites in multi-chamber systems. Institutional winning prerequisites are determined by the decision rule as well as by the number of chamber actors. But in the case of unanimity, the difference between both central European bodies is reduced to their membership size. As a result of the

enlargements, the Council becomes more powerful. Compared to unanimity, a reactive Council unilaterally changes the type of decision rule. Here, the eventual exclusion of some Member States can raise the number of winning sets, so that the institutional winning prerequisite of the Council diminishes, whereas the Commission remains the supranational veto player. Comparable to the enlargement effect on a unanimous Council, the unilateral modification of the institutional winning prerequisite has a negative impact for the chamber, that increases the probability of internal majority building by an increase in the number of winning sets.

Accordingly, membership size will also determine the institutional winning prerequisite. In the case of absolute majority voting, decisive chambers with an uneven number of members have a lower majority prerequisite than comparable chambers with an even number of members as uneven chambers exclude deadlock-situations. In non-decisive chambers, with an even number of members, the complement of a losing coalition is not necessarily a winning one. This aspect of decisiveness alters the institutional winning prerequisite of chambers with weighted actors as well.

In European multi-chamber legislation, Article 148,¹ TEU lays down the possibility for taking Council decisions by simple majority in all cases where another means of voting is not foreseen. In the main, this should apply to procedural decisions, and to some other specific cases. The simple majority consists of an absolute majority of the members of the Council, which has changed from six to fifteen Member States since 1958. Accordingly, a unanimous Commission shares the voting power with a varying number of Member States.

Table 1, second column about here

From the beginning, in 1958, to the first accession in 1973, the non-decisive six Member States held roughly 57% of collective power if they voted by simple majority. For our calculation of voting power we have to take into account 7-Faculty voting sequences of all 5040 possible two-chamber permutations between the six reactive Council members and the Commission. In this case, the Commission had 2160 pivotal positions, and each member state had 480 possibilities to transform a losing coalition into a winning coalition.

Due to the decisiveness of the nine Member States in the period from 1973 to 1981, the collective power of the Council was reduced to 50%. Although the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom raised the amount of voting sequences to 3628800 possible permutations, the lower institutional winning prerequisite of the decisive nine-member Council reduced its collective voting power in European two-chamber legislation.

Both of the following enlargements, the accession of Greece in 1981 and the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, transformed the decisive Council back to a non-decisive committee, so that the Commission lost some collective voting power with regard to Council's simple majority voting. Since 1.1.1995, the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden reduced again the collective voting power of a decisive Council to 50%.

Although the collective power distribution between the Commission and the decisive Council of the nine and the fifteen members is the same, the individual power share of a Member State has fluctuated greatly. From 1973 to 1981, each of the nine Council members were provided with about 5% of formal power, whereas the actual corporate power share of a Member State is about 3% of voting power.

Compared to the period from 1981 to 1986, the collective voting power of a non-decisive Council decreased after the accession of Spain and Portugal. In contrast to unanimity, a higher membership size decreases the institutional winning prerequisite of a non-decisive reactive Council because a higher number of Member States always comes closer to the absolute majority criterion than a lower number of a comparable (non-decisive) committee. In multi-chamber legislation, institutional winning prerequisites determine collective power distribution, and the lower the institutional winning prerequisite of a chamber, the lower its collective power share tends to be.

Whereas the enhancement of the Council's institutional winning prerequisite by simple majority voting would strengthen the Commission's power position with regard to a unanimous Council, this tendency towards supranational legislation never appeared in the past. Simple majority voting would correspond to most supranational power distribution in European two-chamber legislation, whereas Council's qualified majority voting binds its institutional winning prerequisite to a level which is somewhere between unanimity and simple majority voting.

3.3 Qualified Majority - Weighted Votes for Passive Member States

Article 148,2 TEU lays down the possibility for taking Council decisions by qualified majority. The application of a qualified majority in a growing number of policy areas formed one of the crucial points at issue in the constitutional conflict of 1965. The constitutional crisis broke out when the Commission proposed the regulation of agricultural policy, transport policy and external trade policy by a qualified majority in Council. On the one hand, the Luxembourg Accords - often called an agreement to disagree - reinforced the tendency to avoid majority

voting with regard to national sovereignty of the Member States (Kapteyn and Verloren Van Themaat 1990: 249). On the other hand, the avoidance of majority voting by means of a consensus strengthens the collective power of the Member States vis-à-vis the Commission. This becomes evident if we compare the bicameral power distribution between unanimity and qualified majority vote.

Table 2, first column about here

The original weighting of the six Member States provided France, Germany and Italy with four votes, Belgium and the Netherlands with two votes and Luxembourg with one vote. The qualified majority required twelve of seventeen votes, so that the Commission held 35% of voting power. Each of the three large Member States had 15%, Belgium and the Netherlands each had 10% of voting power in European two-chamber legislation, whilst Luxembourg was a dummy player having no pivotal position.

Due to the first enlargement in 1973 and a redefining of voting weights, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom received ten votes, Belgium and the Netherlands five votes, Denmark and Ireland three votes and Luxembourg two votes. The Commission lost a small amount of voting power, but within the new nine-member Council, most of the original six Member States lost some voting power. The highest drop in voting power was registered by Belgium and the Netherlands, which retained only half of their former voting power share, whereas Luxembourg was able to give up its dummy player position. Moreover, Luxembourg became as powerful as the three vote members.

When Greece became the 10th member in 1981, a qualified majority of 45 votes reduced the Commission's power share to about 32%. Within the Council, we can distinguish between the winners, the losers and those who could be said to have experienced no change. The latter were two- and three-vote Member States, which held the same relative power position as before. The winners of the second enlargement were the five-vote members, whilst the larger members lost some voting power.

Following the enlargement of the Community in 1986, Spain was given eight votes and Portugal five. Since 54 votes were now required, the Commission again lost some voting power with regard to European two-chamber legislation. The larger states with ten votes again lost approximately 25% of their former power position, whereas the Member States with five votes retained a narrow power share reduction. In contrast, the three-vote states increased their relative power share, the difference to Luxembourg now being significant.

Since the most recent enlargement in 1995, 62 of 87 votes define the qualified majority of the fifteen Council members. For the first time, the Commission's power share was not decreased as a consequence of an increase of the size of Council's membership. Instead, all former members lost some power on the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Concerning the enlargements of the Community, since the Rome Treaties the Commission's voting power share has continuously decreased in European two-chamber legislation from 35% in 1958 to about 31% in 1995. At the same time, the increasing application of Council's qualified majority voting has strengthened the power position of the supranational Commission vis-à-vis a reactive Council. Within the Council, Luxembourg certainly profited the most from the enlargement because it was able to give up its original dummy player position. Denmark and Ireland also extended their relative power position, whereas the large Member States lost about 40% of their original voting power position over the period. Beyond all doubt, the highest reduction in power shares resulting from the accession of new members has been experienced by Belgium and the Netherlands. Since 1958, both Member States have lost more than half their original relative power position when the Council votes by qualified majority.

Another type of qualified majority voting is listed in the second column of Table 2. If the decision is not taken on the basis of a Commission proposal, the two-chamber problem of both central European bodies, the Commission and the Council, is reduced to an internal coalition problem of the Member States. In such a case, qualified majority further requires that a certain minimum number of members must support a proposal. The power distribution refers to a second criterion restricting the conditions for qualified majority building, and as a consequence of the second criterion, for instance, Luxembourg did not act as a dummy player with regard to qualified majority voting in the original six-member Council.

Compared to simple majority voting, being a winner or a loser of qualified majority modifications is not a rhetorical phrase. In particular, the progress to twelve members has substantially contributed to a greater tendency to vote by qualified majority in Council. In 1986 the Council indicated that it had tripled majority voting in the first half of 1986 in relation to the 15 majority voting decisions of 1985. Moreover, the internal rule of Council's qualified majority voting was significantly changed in 1987. The President of the Member States can now initiate the proceedings of majority voting when required to open voting on the invitation of the Commission or a member of the Council (Kapteyn and Verloren Van Themaat 1990: 250).

When the Single European Act came into force, the number of Commission proposals based on Article 148,2 rose significantly. Article 148,2 offers the possibility to take decisions by

qualified majority. If the members of the Council of Ministers are reactive, some of them can be excluded by qualified majority vote. In such a case, the collective power share of a reactive Council is decreased to less than 70% of the total voting power. The supranational Commission power share thus increases when the Council takes a reactive majority position. Whereas supranational majority voting only occurs when the members of the Council hold a reactive role in European legislation, an objection to vital interest or a proactive modification of Commission proposals still requires Council unanimity which strengthens the power position of consensual Member States in European two-chamber legislation.

Apart from regular European two-chamber legislation, the Single European Act of 1987 introduced the new text of Article 149 relating to the cooperation procedure. For the first time, the European Parliament was formally able to participate in European legislation. Party politics became a new dimension of the inter-institutional coalition problem in European decision making, which is mostly characterised by a conflict between the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers.

4. From Reactive Supranationalism to Intergovernmental Party Politics

Although being directly elected since 1979, European Parliament still differs widely from parliaments in the Member States of the European Union. The strict separation of European powers prevents the coincidence of parliamentary and governmental majorities, typical of parliamentary systems. The original Common Assembly was only given the power to debate the activities of the High Authority (later the Commission) and to pass a motion of censure by a two-thirds majority which would oblige the executive to resign in its entirety. The Treaties also stated that the European Parliament be consulted on certain areas of legislation. The limited parliamentary control of the Commission and the minor legislative competence of the European Parliament are often the source of criticism on European politics, although important modifications to Parliament's position were made in relation to the budget treaties of 1970 and 1975, the introduction of the budgetary conciliation procedure in 1975, the direct elections to European Parliament in 1979, the ruling of the Court of Justice concerning the unavoidable consultation of the Parliament in 1980, the introduction of the cooperation procedure in 1987 and of the co-decision procedure in 1993 (Jacobs and Corbett 1990: 6,7).

However, the legislative competences of the European Parliament are not only limited to certain selected policy areas. In European legislation, parliamentary actors are obliged to resort

to absolute majority building if they wish to participate in some policy areas. European parliamentary activities are restricted to the absolute majority criterion, regardless of whether a Commission proposal be finally amended, adopted or rejected. This is an important difference to most parliamentary systems where the failure to build parliamentary consent implies the rejection of a bill. Here, the European procedural logic interprets the lack of parliamentary absolute majority building as parliamentary consent to a Commission proposal. Without comment from the European Parliament, the original draft can still be negotiated between the actors of both central European bodies, the Council and the Commission. In most cases, European legislation originates with the Commission, the European Parliament gives its opinion and the Council of Ministers adopts the proposal. Both central European bodies, the Council and the Commission, explain their positions to European Parliament, but they are not operating through Parliament (Jacobs and Corbett 1990: 5,6).

4.1 Selective Cooperation in European Politics

The cooperation procedure, as introduced in the Single European Act (1987), gives the European Parliament the opportunity to influence European legislation in selected policy areas, and relating in particular to provisions important for the completion of the internal market. The cooperation procedure extends European two-chamber legislation to an inter-institutional three-chamber coalition problem. The participation of the European Parliament in European legislation raises the question of how under cooperation procedure the bicameral coalition problem of the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers is supplemented by the party politics of the European Parliament, itself dependent on an internal two-step coalition problem.

The first reading in the cooperation procedure corresponds to the standard procedure: Commission proposal, opinion of European Parliament and then (unlimited) examination by the Council, which does not then lead to a Council act, but instead to a Council common position, adopted either by qualified majority or by unanimity. Once the common position has been adopted, the second reading enables the European Parliament to express an opinion on the proposal within a period of three months. The European Parliament can approve the common position either by an absolute parliamentary majority or by taking no action to the proposal, so that a qualified majority in Council may then be sufficient to adopt the bill. No parliamentary

action corresponds to a "negative" coalition of a passive agreement, whereas the parliamentary adoption can be called a "positive" coalition.

For both possibilities, either the negative or the positive coalition, the number of winning sets are the same in a decisive European Parliament. In non-decisive committees, and the European Parliament has ever been non-decisive, the passive consent can have a higher number of winning sets by the inclusion of all deadlock configurations. The institutional winning prerequisite is changed by the non-decisiveness of a committee, e.g. in the present 626-member European Parliament at least 314 members have to adopt a proposal, whereas 313 members already determine a negative consent. As a result, the power distribution will be affected by the decrease in the institutional winning prerequisite.

Further, the European Parliament may reject the proposal or it may also amend the proposal by an absolute majority vote. In the first case it is important to note that parliamentary rejection can only raise the Council's collective power, as the Member States have then to adopt the proposal by unanimity. The linkage to a reactive Council points out the equivocal setting of the cooperation procedure with regard to parliamentary integration in European legislation. If the European Parliament does not express an opinion on the common position, the inter-governmental coalition problem of the Member States is decreased to one of qualified majority, which can strengthen the power position of the supranational Commission. Moreover, parliamentary input is also limited if a parliamentary rejection of the common position leads to a proactive Council. In both cases, the role of the European Parliament is reduced in any eventual modification to the application of Council's decision rule.

Parliamentary collaboration in European legislation is only possible if the European Parliament proposes amendments to the Council's common position that are examined by the Commission. In this case, the Commission may decide to incorporate all or part of the parliamentary amendments. If the Commission does not agree to parliamentary amendments, the Council can adopt them by unanimity. Nevertheless, the European Parliament is not able to bring parliamentary positions to bear on European legislation without the support of the actors of both central European bodies.

The European Parliament itself can either refuse legislative collaboration or the parliamentary amendments may serve as a strategic argument for the actors of both central European bodies. Tsebelis (1994: 131) refers to this situation of the European Parliament under cooperation procedure as being the position of a conditional agenda setter. Another interpretation sees the European Parliament as a conditional veto player because the European Parliament can also block a Commission proposal by increasing the institutional winning prerequisite.

For the calculation of voting power under cooperation procedure we have, then, to distinguish between two sets of winning sets. The first set consists of the actors of both central European bodies, the unanimous Commission and the unanimous Council members. If they decide unanimously, then the European Parliament has no pivotal position under cooperation procedure. The second set of winning sets is defined on the Commission, the qualified majority of the reactive Council members, and the majority of the European Parliament.

Due to the European procedural logic, which interprets the failure of the non-decisive Parliament to build on absolute majority as parliamentary consent to a Commission proposal, the passive consent determines the parliamentary part of this second set of winning sets. Thus, the Commission is pivotal if Council members decide unanimously, or with more than 62 and less than 87 Member States' votes, and with at least the (negative) majority of the European Parliament. A Member State is pivotal if the Commission and all other Member States adopt a proposal, or its weighted vote transforms a Council losing coalition into a qualified winning coalition, and at least the (negative) parliamentary majority and the Commission are in favour of a bill. A national parliamentary delegation is only pivotal if the delegation transforms a (negative) parliamentary losing coalition into a winning coalition, and the Commission as well as more than 62 and less than 87 reactive Member States' votes are in favour of a proposal. In Table 3 we have listed the collective power share of the three chambers involved in the cooperation procedure.

Table 3, first column about here

Since the Single European Act came into force, the Commission and the Member States have dominated the cooperation procedure. The actors of both central European bodies are part of both winning sets, whereas the actors of the European Parliament are only pivotal if Council members play a reactive role in European tricameralism. The European Parliament is provided with about 14% of total voting power, whereby the parliamentary groups of the Socialists (SOC) and of the European People's Party (PPE) hold more than half of the total parliamentary power share. Within the Socialist group, the British Labour Party is dominant, followed by the German Social Democrats. The German Christian Democrats hold more than a fourth of the PPE-power share, whereas the internal power distribution of the Liberals is quite even. The other parliamentary groups and their party delegations are less relevant in European politics. This also goes for the independents, who have not yet been able to profit from the non-decisiveness of the European Parliament. Compared to bicameral legislation, the Commission

loses approximately 10% of its voting power under cooperation procedure. The absolute power loss of the Council is higher, but the Member States are still dominant with more than 57% of total voting power.

So, under cooperation procedure the European Parliament was formally allowed to participate in European legislation, although its application is limited to selected policy areas, in particular to the internal market programme (Raworth 1993: 139-141). The co-decision procedure, as introduced in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, has led to frequent discussion of a stepwise, though continuous integration of the European Parliament in European politics. If the assumption of a stepwise parliamentary integration holds true, then parliamentary actors will gradually gain higher shares of voting power in European legislation.

4.2 The Co-Decision Procedure: Party Politics at the Expense of the Commission

Under the co-decision procedure the Commission's former legislative monopoly over mediation has been broken. A direct linkage between the Council and the European Parliament has been introduced which may strengthen the parliamentary position in European politics (Boest 1992: 182). Under the co-decision procedure the European Parliament is provided with a veto right, and a conciliation committee, established in such cases of disagreement, is comprised of an equal number of Council members and of delegates from European Parliament. The conciliation committee symbolises the loss of Commission's power in European legislation: If agreement is reached, the proposal is submitted for approval to Parliament by absolute majority as well as to the Council by qualified majority. At this stage, any change or even the withdrawal of the proposal by the Commission is no longer possible (Streunenberg 1994: 655). The most important difference between the cooperation and the co-decision procedures is that the supranational veto can be overridden by Council qualified majority as well as by an absolute majority vote in Parliament, although the Commission still has the sole right of initiative.

Apart from that, the first reading and following steps of the co-decision procedure correspond to those of the cooperation procedure: Commission proposal, opinion of European Parliament and then (unlimited) examination by the Council, which does not lead to a Council act, but to a Council common position adopted either by qualified majority or by unanimity. The second step is then the adoption of the proposal by at least qualified Council majority if an absolute parliamentary majority approves the proposal without amendments (1. variant, Article 189b,a).

The proposal is also approved if the European Parliament does not express an opinion (2. variant, Article 189b,b). In cases of amendments under the co-decision procedure, the Commission and the European Parliament change their prior position under cooperation procedure: The Commission can now influence the Council decision rule by its rejection or approval of the parliamentary amendments. If the Commission is in favour of the parliamentary amendments, a qualified Council majority is sufficient to adopt a proposal (3. variant, Article 189b,d3,1). If the Commission rejects the amendments, the Council can override the Commission's rejection by unanimity (4. variant, Article 189b,d3,2). Thus, under the co-decision procedure the Commission becomes the conditional veto player or agenda setter, the role that the European Parliament may play under cooperation procedure. As another possibility, the European Parliament can also reject the proposal which will be followed by the establishment of a conciliation committee. The conciliation committee can propose a compromise that can be adopted by a qualified Council majority and an absolute parliamentary majority (5. variant, Article 189b,c). If the conciliation committee does not present a compromise, a qualified Council majority and a negative parliamentary majority, meaning that the European Parliament does not express an opinion to the former common position, can adopt the proposal (6. variant, Article 189d6).

For the calculation of voting power under the co-decision procedure, we can reduce the six procedural variants to two different sets of winning sets. According to the first three variants, a decision is made if the Commission, the (negative) parliamentary majority and a qualified majority are in favour of a proposal. For the last three variants, the Commission loses its pivotal position so that a (negative) parliamentary majority and a qualified majority of the Member States determine the second set of winning sets.

Table 3, second column about here

The result of the Commission's veto loss is its weakening under the co-decision procedure which benefits the European Parliament less than the Council. Compared to the cooperation procedure, the collective voting power of the Member States increases to 63%, whereas the Commission has approximately 20% of total voting power under the co-decision procedure. Parliament's position remains almost unchanged so that the voting power shares of the parliamentary groups as well as of the national delegations are similar to those under the cooperation procedure. Moreover, the application of the co-decision procedure is also limited to only certain policy areas. In particular, the co-decision procedure applies to specific articles

on education, health, traffic and environmental policies as well as to free movement and policies pertaining to the internal market finally established in 1993.

5. From Selective Tricameralism to Policy Domain Bicameralism ?

The role of the European Parliament in European decision making is often contrasted with that of the intergovernmental members of the Council of Ministers (Moravcsik 1991). The role of the European Parliament in European decision making often gives rise to discussions on the democratic deficit of European legislation (Ludlow 1991: 123). In this respect, a growing influence of the European Parliament in European politics can transform the intergovernmental confederation into a federal union, where both the Council and the European Parliament have prominent legislative competences, whereas the Commission's competence is restricted to executive affairs (Mueller 1994).

Before predicting the future development of European politics towards supranationalism, intergovernmentalism or party politics, we first have to take into account two interrelated types of integration: Firstly, the institutional integration which changes the theoretical inter-institutional power relationship by constitutional reforms. Secondly, the material integration which modifies the effective inter-institutional relationship by reforming the field of operational application to different procedures. For the latter, we can observe a minor integration of the European Parliament by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 (Raworth 1993: 139-141). Otherwise, in the case of a stepwise material integration of the European Parliament, previous articles with a lower parliamentary participation should have been taken over in a procedural category that increases the legislative competence of the European Parliament, i.e. from consultation to the cooperation procedure. In contrast, the Maastricht Treaty only raised parliamentary competence in some specific cases, whilst the most prominent European policy area, the agricultural policy, remains under standard procedure. In a similar sense, this is also true for social or (anti)-discrimination policies which are still negotiated under cooperation procedure.

With regard to institutional integration, we found a tendency towards reactive supranationalism in bicameral politics if the Commission is in the position of having to deal with passive Member States. Otherwise it is the Council that dominates European legislation, whereby the unanimous Council's collective voting power increased along with each enlargement. Although the Commission could strengthen its position vis-à-vis a reactive Council, the Commission paid the bill for the introduction of party politics into European legislation. The Commission's

voting power share was decreased by the introduction of the cooperation as well as the co-decision procedure. This result, which indicates a tendency toward a party political intergovernmentalism, is surprising, but had already emerged by the end of the 1970s. If we consider the budget reforms as being the predecessor of institutional reforms in sectoral legislation, inter-institutional modifications will be seen to weaken the Commission's position. In budgetary politics, the European Parliament and the Council stand face to face. The Member States dominate the area of non-compulsory expenditure with 2/3 of total voting power, whereas the European Parliament commands over more than 50% of voting power in cases of compulsory expenditure.

Both material and institutional integration reveal some patterns of previous institutional reforms. As far as previous reforms can help us predict the developing institutional framework, the future characteristic of the European Union will be a powerful Council in all policy areas, and the condition of a reactive consent of all members will guarantee the dominant position of the Member States in European politics. Budgetary politics and the exclusion of the Commission under co-decision procedure indicate that the Commission "or" the European Parliament will counterbalance intergovernmental dominance, and their position will change according to the field of application. Under this "Policy Domain Bicameralism", those European policy areas attracting public attention will probably relate more to the party politics of the European Parliament, whereas other policy areas, in particular those of a higher technical impact, will be subject to the negotiation between the Commission and the Member States.

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Figure 1: The inter-institutional and internal coalition problem of European Politics




Table 1: Unanimity (first columns) and Simple Majority (second columns)

	1958 - 1972		1973 - 1980		1981	1983	1986 - 1994		1995 -	
	unani- mity	simple maj	unani- mity	simple maj	unani- mity	simple maj	unani- mity	simple maj	unani- mity	simple maj
Commission	.1429	.4286	0.100	.5000	.0909	.4545	.0769	.4615	.0625	.5000
Council										
France	.1429	.0952	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Germany	.1429	.0952	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Italy	.1429	.0952	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Un. Kingdom	-	-	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Belgium	.1429	.0952	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Greece	-	-	-	-	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Netherlands	.1429	.0952	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0625	.0333
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0625	.0333
Denmark	-	-	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Ireland	-	-	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0625	.0333
Luxembourg	.1429	.0952	.1000	.0556	.0909	.0545	.0769	.0449	.0625	.0333
Sum of Council	.8571	.5714	.9000	0.500	.9090	.5455	.9231	.5385	.9375	.5000
Sum	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

Table 2: Qualified Majority with (first columns) and without (second columns) Commission Proposal

	1958 - 1972		1973 - 1980		1981 - 1985		1986 - 1994		1995 -	
	with	without	with	without	with	without	with	without	with	without
Commission	.3500	-	.3460	-	.3214	-	.3103	-	.3103	-
Council										
France	.1500	.2167	.1278	.1706	.1202	.1714	.0931	.1301	.0810	.1114
Germany	.1500	.2167	.1278	.1706	.1202	.1714	.0931	.1301	.0810	.1114
Italy	.1500	.2167	.1278	.1706	.1202	.1714	.0931	.1301	.0810	.1114
Un. Kingdom	-	-	.1278	.1706	.1202	.1714	.0931	.1301	.0810	.1114
Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0770	.1088	.0662	.0920
Belgium	.1000	.1667	.0429	.0873	.0468	.0722	.0436	.0657	.0377	.0563
Greece	-	-	-	-	.0468	.0722	.0436	.0657	.0377	.0563
Netherlands	.1000	.1667	.0429	.0873	.0468	.0722	.0436	.0657	.0377	.0563
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0436	.0657	.0377	.0563
Austria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0310	.0476
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0310	.0476
Denmark	-	-	.0190	.0635	.0190	.0325	.0290	.0462	.0242	.0389
Ireland	-	-	.0190	.0635	.0190	.0325	.0290	.0462	.0242	.0389
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.0242	.0389
Luxembourg	.0000	.0167	.0190	.0159	.0190	.0325	.0075	.0159	.0141	.0251
Sum of Council	.6500	1.0000	.6540	1.0000	.6786	1.0000	.6897	1.0000	.6897	1.0000
Sum	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000

Table 3: Cooperation and Co-decision procedure

	Cooperation				Co-decision		
	1-1-87	Elect. 6-89	Elect. 6-94	Enlarg. 1-95	1-1-93	Elect. 6-94	Enlarg. 1-95
Commission	.2818	.2819	.2835	.2851	.2050	.2066	.2226
Council							
France	.0778	.0778	.0784	.0678	.0827	.0835	.0713
Germany	.0778	.0778	.0784	.0678	.0827	.0835	.0713
Italy	.0778	.0778	.0784	.0678	.0827	.0835	.0713
Un. Kingdom	.0778	.0778	.0784	.0678	.0827	.0835	.0713
Spain	.0643	.0643	.0648	.0555	.0693	.0699	.0590
Belgium	.0366	.0366	.0368	.0314	.0416	.0420	.0349
Greece	.0366	.0366	.0368	.0314	.0416	.0420	.0349
Netherlands	.0366	.0366	.0368	.0314	.0416	.0420	.0349
Portugal	.0366	.0366	.0368	.0314	.0416	.0420	.0349
Austria	-	-	-	.0260	-	-	.0295
Sweden	-	-	-	.0260	-	-	.0295
Denmark	.0246	.0246	.0247	.0205	.0295	.0298	.0240
Ireland	.0246	.0246	.0247	.0205	.0295	.0298	.0240
Finland	-	-	-	.0205	-	-	.0240
Luxembourg	.0068	.0068	.0068	.0121	.0118	.0119	.0156
Sum of Council	.5778	.5775	.5819	.5776	.6373	.6435	.6304
Parliament							
SOC	.0551	.0580	.0513	.0534	.0653	.0579	.0577
PPE	.0317	.0282	.0313	.0321	.0333	.0366	.0357
ED	.0171	.0088	-	-	.0096	-	-
CG	.0106	.0031	-	-	.0034	-	-
GUE	-	.0066	.0068	.0061	.0071	.0072	.0063
LIB	.0093	.0141	.0119	.0138	.0154	.0128	.0144
RDE	.0073	.0049	.0064	.0055	.0053	.0068	.0057
ARC	.0036	.0031	-	-	.0034	-	-
REA	.0027	.0041	.0047	.0041	.0044	.0050	.0042
V	-	.0071	.0054	.0055	.0076	.0058	.0057
FE	-	-	.0065	.0058	-	.0070	.0060
EN	-	-	.0047	.0041	-	.0050	.0042
NI	.0030	.0027	.0056	.0069	.0028	.0058	.0069
Sum of Parliament	.1404	.1406	.1346	.1373	.1577	.1499	.1470
Sum of all	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000