How robust are compliance findings? A research Synthesis (A Research Synthesis on EU Member States' Compliance with EU Directives)

Dataset Codebook

Version August 2012

Mariyana Angelova, Tanja Dannwolf, Thomas König¹

¹ The authors's names are given in alphabetical order. All authors contributed equally to all of the work. If you use the data for publication please cite this article as follows: Mariyana Angelova, Tanja Dannwolf & Thomas König (2012): Forum Section: How robust are compliance findings? A research synthesis., Journal of European Public Policy, 19(8): 1269-1291.

Tables of Content

List of Variables	
1. Information on this Codebook	5
2. Study and Research Design Information	5
Study ID	5
Type of Research Design	
Number of Cases	
3. Information on the Dependent Variable	9
Categorization of the Dependent Variable	9
Dependent Variable Categorization (aggregated):	
4. Information on the Independent Variables	
ID Independent Variable	
Independent Variable Categorization	
Theoretical Argument of the Independent Variable	14
Effect of the Independent Variable on Compliance	14
Significance Level	
5. Country Information	
Country Dummies	
6. Policy field information	
Celex Policy Fields (as of October 2010)	

List of Variables

Variable Name	Short Description
	h Design Information
studyid	Study id: numerical code
studyid.label	Study id: label
type	Research design type: qualitative, quantitative,
	descriptive: numerical code
type.label	Research design type: qualitative, quantitative,
	descriptive: label
ncases	Total number of cases investigated in the coded article
Dependent Variable	e Information
dv	Dependent variable category: numerical code
dv.label	Dependent variable category: label
dvcat	Dependent variable category (aggregated to three
	categories): numerical code for transposition,
	infringements, application
dvcat.label	Dependent variable category (aggregated to three
	categories): label
Independent Varia	ble Information and Effects on Compliance
ivnr	Independent variable count
indvar.author	Independent variable as specified by the author
indvar	Independent variable categorization (<i>measurement</i>
	level): numerical code
indvar.label	Independent variable categorization (<i>measurement</i>
	level): label
ivtheoryneu	Independent variable categorization (theoretical level
	adjusted labeling of the theoretical argument (for mor
	info see below): numerical code
ivtheoryneu.label	Independent variable categorization (<i>theoretical</i> level
1, 11001 9 110 4.140 01	adjusted labeling of the theoretical argument (for mor
	info see below): label
theoryeffect	Independent variable: direction of the <i>theoretical</i>
	argument on COMPLIANCE: numeric code
theoryeffect.label	Independent variable: direction of the <i>theoretical</i>
11001 y 011001.14001	argument on COMPLIANCE: label
significant	Significance level (for qualitative and quantitative
Significant	studies, see below for more information): numerical
	code
significant.label	Significance level: label
Country Informatio	-
austria	
	Country dummy
belgium	Country dummy
bulgaria	Country dummy
cyprus	Country dummy
czech_Republic	Country dummy
denmark	Country dummy
efta	Country group dummy (includes Iceland, Lichtenstein

	Norway, Switzerland)
estonia	Country dummy
finland	Country dummy
france	Country dummy
germany	Country dummy
greece	Country dummy
hungary	Country dummy
ireland	Country dummy
italy	Country dummy
latvia	Country dummy
lithuania	Country dummy
luxembourg	Country dummy
malta	Country dummy
netherlands	Country dummy
poland	Country dummy
portugal	Country dummy
romania	Country dummy
slovakia	Country dummy
slovenia	Country dummy
spain	Country dummy
sweden	Country dummy
turkey	Country dummy
uk	Country dummy

Policy field information: CELEX Categorization

Policy field information	tion: CELEX Categorization
env_cons_health	Environment, consumers and health protection
agr_fish	Agriculture;
	Fisheries
energy	Energy
labour_social	Freedom of movement for workers and social policy
justice	Area of freedom, security and justice
transport	Transport Policy
economy	Economic and monetary policy and free movement of
	capital
tax	Taxation
internal_Market	Industrial policy and internal market
undertakings	Law relating to undertatings
services	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
customs	Customs union and free movement of goods
competition	Competition policy
finance	General financial and institutional matters
exterior	External relations
eucitizenship	People's europe
all_no_diffenition	No specific policy field

1. Information on this Codebook

The dataset is provided in two formats: R and Stata format (.dta). In R the value labels are included as string variables. In Stata the value labels are attached to the variables. For each variable the names of the numerical variables and the value labels are indicated in the codebook.

The dataset is accompanied by a codebook with coding instructions. The corresponding relational database is available from the authors on request.

2. Study and Research Design Information

Description:	Each study in the dataset was assigned a unique running number. The correct citation is provided in the column citation.
Variable name:	studyid
Variable label:	
Value label:	studyid.label /studyidlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	1.1. Study ID

Study ID

studyi	studyid	Citation
dnum	01 D : (1007)	
I	01 Duina (1997)	Duina, F. (1997) 'Explaining legal implementation in the European Union', International Journal of the Sociology of Law 25(2): 155–79
2	02 Knill and	Knill, C. and Lenschow, A. (1998) 'Coping with Europe:
	Lenshow (1998)	the impact of British and German administrations on the implementation of EU environmental policy', Journal of European Public Policy 5(4): 595–614.
3	03 Lampinien	Lampinen, R. and UUsikyla, P. (1998) 'Implementation
	and Uusikylae	deficit - why member states do not comply with EU
	(1998)	directives?' Scandinavian Political Studies 21(3): 231–51.
4	04 Mbaye	Mbaye, H.A.D. (2001) 'Why national states comply with
	(2001)	supranational law. Explaining implementation
		infringements in the European Union, 1972–1993',
		European Union Politics 2(3): 259–81.
5	05 Hille and	Hille, P. and Knill, C. (2006) "It's the bureaucracy,
	Knill (2006)	stupid." The implementation of the acquis communautaire
		in EU candidate countries, 1999–2003', European Union
		Politics 7(4): 531–52
6	06 Duina and	Duina, F. and Blithe, F. (1999) 'Nation-states and common
	Blithe (1999)	markets: the institutional conditions for acceptance',
		Review of International Political Economy 6(4): 494–530.
7	07 Haverland	Haverland, M. (2000) 'National adaptation to European
	(2000)	integration: the importance of institutional veto points',
	•	

0	09 Magtarhagala	Journal of Public Policies 20(1): 83–103.
8	08 Mastenbroek (2003)	Mastenbroek, E. (2003) 'Surviving the deadline: the transposition of EU directives in the Netherlands', European Union Politics 4(4): 371–95.
11	11 Dimitrakopoulos (2001)	Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2001) 'Learning and steering: changing implementation patterns and the Greek central government', Journal of European Public Policy 8(4): 604– 22.
13	13 Jensen (2007)	Jensen, C.B. (2007) 'Implementing Europe: a question of oversight', European Union Politics 8(4): 451–77.
14	14 Berglund, Gande, Waarden (2006)	Berglund, S., Gange, I. and Van Waarden, F. (2006) 'Mass production of law. Routinization in the transposition of European directives: a sociological institutionalist account', Journal of European Public Policy 13(5): 692– 716.
15	15 Haverland, Steunenberg and van Waarden (2008)	Haverland, M., Steunenberg, B. and Waarden, F.V. (2008) 'Sectors at different speeds: analyzing transposition deficits in the European Union', ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Rennes, 11–16 April.
16	16 Sverdrup 2004	Sverdrup, U. (2004) 'Compliance and conflict management in the European Union: Nordic exceptionalism', Scandinavian Political Studies 27(1): 23–43.
17	17 Thomson (2007)	Thomson, R. (2007) 'Time to comply: national responses to six EU labour market directives revisited', West European Politics 30(5): 987–1008.
18	18 Perkins and Neumayer (2007)	Perkins, R. and Neumayer, E. (2007) 'Do membership benefits buy regulatory compliance? An empirical analysis of EU directives 1978–1999', European Union Politics 8(2): 180–206.
19	19 Bursens (2002)	Bursens, P. (2002) 'Why Denmark and Belgium have different implementation records: on transposition laggards and leaders in the EU', Scandinavian Political Studies 25(2): 173–95
20	20 Bailey (2002)	Bailey, I. (2002) 'National adaptation to European integration: institutional vetoes and goodness-of-fit', Journal of European Public Policy 9(5): 791–811.
21	21 Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber and Treib (2004)	Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M., Leiber, S. and Treib, O. (2004) 'Non-compliance with EU directives in the member states: opposition through the backdoor', West European Politics 27(3): 452–73.
22	22 Dimitrova,Rhina rd (2005)	Dimitrova, A. and Rhinard, M. (2005) 'The power of norms in the transposition of EU directives', European Integration Online Papers 9(16), available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-016a.htm (accessed 4 July 2012).
23	23 Toshkov (2008)	Toshkov, D. (2008) 'Embracing European law: compliance with EU directives in Central and Eastern Europe', European Union Politics 9(3): 379–402.
24	24 Thomson, Torenvlied, Arregui (2007)	Thomson, R., Torenvlied, R. and Arregui, J. (2007) 'The paradox of compliance: infringements and delays in transposing European Union directives', British Journal of

		Political Science 37(4): 685–709.
25	25 Haverland and Romeijn (2007)	Haverland, M., Romeijn, M. (2007) Do member states make European policies work? Analyzing the EU transposition deficit, Public Administration, 85(3): 757-
26	26 Steunenberg (2006)	778. Steunenberg, B. (2006) 'Turning swift policy-making into deadlock and delay. National policy coordination and the transposition of EU directives', European Union Politics 7(3): 293–319.
28	28 Toshkov (2008)	Toshkov, D. (2008) 'Embracing European law: compliance with EU directives in Central and Eastern Europe', European Union Politics 9(3): 379–402.
29	29 Keading (2008)	Kaeding, M. (2008) 'Lost in translation or full steam ahead – the transposition of EU transport directives across member states', European Union Politics 9(1): 115–43.
30	30 Falkner and Treib (2008)	Falkner, G. and Treib, O. (2008) 'Three worlds of compliance or four? The EU-15 compared to new member states', Journal of Common Market Studies 46(2): 293– 313.
31	31 Borghetto (2006)	Borghetto, E., Franchino, F. and Giannetti, D. (2006) 'Complying with the transposition deadlines of EU directives. evidence from Italy', Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 1(1): 7–38.
32	32 Giuliani (2003)	Giuliani, M. (2003) 'Europeanization in comparative perspective: institutional fit and national adaptation', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–55.
33	33 Mastenbroek and Keulen (2006)	Mastenbroek, E. and Van Keulen, M. (2006) 'Beyond the goodness of fit: a preference-based account of europeanization', in R. Holzhacker and M. Haverland (eds), European Research Reloaded: Cooperation and Integration among Europeanized States, Dortrecht: Springer, pp. 19–42.
35	35 Zubek (2005)	Zubek, R. (2005) 'Complying with transposition commitments in Poland: collective dilemmas, core executive and legislative outcomes', West European Politics 28(3): 592–619.
36	36 Bugdahn (2005)	Bugdahn, S. (2005) 'Of Europeanization and domestication: the implementation of the environmental information directive in Ireland, Great Britain and Germany', Journal of European Public Policy 12(1): 177– 99.
37	37 Boerzel (2002)	Börzel, T.A. (2002) 'Pace-setting, foot-dragging, and fence-sitting: member state responses to Europeanization', Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 193–214.
38	38 Boerzel (2000)	Börzel, T.A. (2000) 'Why there is no "southern problem". On environmental leaders and laggards in the European Union', Journal of European Public Policy 7(1): 141–62.
39	39 Boerzel (2006)	Börzel, T.A. (2006) 'Participation through law enforcement – the case of the European Union',

40	40 Linos (2007)	Comparative Political Studies 39(1): 128–52. Linos, K. (2007) 'How can international organizations shape national welfare states? Evidence from compliance with European Union directives', Comparative Political Studies 40(5): 547–70.
41	41 Sedelmeier (2008)	Sedelmeier, U. (2008) 'After conditionality: post-accession compliance with EU – law in East Central Europe', Journal of European Public Policy 15(6): 806–25.
43	43 Falkner, Hartlapp, Treib (2007)	Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M. and Treib, O. (2007) 'Worlds of compliance: why leading approaches to EU implementation are only sometimes-true theories', European Journal of Political Research 46(3): 395–416.
44	44 Koenig and Luetgert (2009)	König, T. and Luetgert, B. (2009) 'Troubles with transposition? Explaining trends in member-state notification and the delayed
45	45 Luetgert and Dannwolf (2009)	Luetgert, B. and Dannwolf, T. (2009) 'Mixing methods: an analysis of EU member state transposition patterns', European Union Politics 10(3): 307–34.
48	48 Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009)	Steunenberg, B. and Toshkov, D. (2009) 'Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU: the impact of discretion and legal fit', Journal of European Public Policy 16(7): 951–70.
49	49 Thomson (2009)	Thomson, R. (2009) 'Same effects in different worlds: the transposition of EU directives', Journal of European Public Policy 16(1): 1–18.

Type of Research Design

Description:	This variable indicates the research design type in each coded study.
Variable name:	type
Variable label:	Type of Research Design
Value label:	type.label /typelabel
For more information refer to Database	1.8. Research Design
Codebook:	

Value	Label	Description
1	Quantitative	Inferential Statistics: the study applies inferential statistics (regression analysis)
2	Descriptive	Descriptive Statistics: the study evaluates quantitative data using discriptive statistics
3	Qualitative	Case Study: the study conducts case study analysis.

Number of Cases

Description:	This variable indicates the number of cases analyzed in a given article. The values correspond to the number of cases as stated by the author of the article.
Variable name:	ncases
Variable label:	
Value label:	none
For more information	1.5. Total Number of Cases
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

3. Information on the Dependent Variable

Categorization of the Dependent Variable

Description:	Categorization of the dependent variable (type of non-
	compliance) in each coded study.
Variable name:	dv
Variable label:	
Value label:	dv.label/dvlabel
For more information	2. Dependent Variable Information
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

Value	Value Label
Transposition	
100	Transposition
Duration	-
101	\rightarrow until correct transposition
102	\rightarrow until first instrument
104	\rightarrow until last instrument
103	\rightarrow duration delay
Legal Implem	entation
110	→timely
120	→correct
130	\rightarrow correct and timely
140	→pre Accession
Actual Applic	ation
200	\rightarrow Actual application
240	\rightarrow Legal implementation and actual application
Infringements	5
300	Infringement
301	→Formal Letter
302	→Reasoned Opinions
303	→Referrals

310	Non-notification
311	→Formal Letter
312	→Reasoned Opinions
313	→Referrals
320	Non conformity
321	→Formal Letter
322	→Reasoned Opinions
323	→Referrals
330	Bad application
331	→Formal Letter
332	→Reasoned Opinions
333	→Referrals
340	Non compliance with ECJ Judgments
341	→Formal Letter
342	→Reasoned Opinions
343	→Referrals
400	Court Cases
401	→Non-notification
402	→Non-conformity
403	\rightarrow Bad application
404	\rightarrow Non-compliance with a court judgment
410	Court Judgments
411	\rightarrow Negative for Member states
412	\rightarrow Positive for Member states
500	Combinations
501	\rightarrow Transposition, application and enforcement
502	\rightarrow Transposition and application
600	Decentralized Enforcement

Dependent Variable Categorization (aggregated):

Description:	This variable indicates the aggregated category of the dependent variable (type of non-compliance) based on the variable dvcode.
Variable name:	dvcat
Variable label:	
Value label:	dvcat.label/dvcatlabel
For more information	
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

This variable is coded using the information from dv.code in the following way:

Values	Value labels	Corresponding categories from dvcode
1	Transposition	100:140
2	Infringements	300:343, also two particular article with dv.code equal to 411 and 500 which use infringement data.
3	Application	200, 240, 501, 502, 600

4. Information on the Independent Variables

ID Independent Variable

Description:	This variable indicates the consecutive number of the independent variables in each coded study. The ID is an unique identifier within each study.
Variable name:	ivnr
Variable label:	
Value label:	
For more information	3.1. Numbering
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

Independent Variable: Author

Description:	This variable indicates the name of the independent variable as
	specified by the author
Variable name:	indvar.autor/ indvarauthor
Variable label:	
Value label:	indvar.author/ indvarauthor
For more information	3.2 Name of the Independent Variable
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

Independent Variable Categorization

Description:	This variable indicates the measurement of independent variable.
Variable name:	indvar/ indvar
Variable label:	
Value label:	indvar.label / indvarlabel
For more information	3.7. Operationalization Level: Categorization
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

value	value label
Directive	Characteristics
0100	directive specific indicators
0101	\rightarrow length of deadline
0102	\rightarrow commission directive
0103	→council directive
0104	\rightarrow co-decision directive
0106	\rightarrow length of text/number of recitals
0107	→discretion
0108	\rightarrow quality/clarity of directve
0109	→new directive
0110	→amending directive

Goodness of fit		
0200	goodness of fit	
0210	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with national policy legacies/traditions	
0211	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with the organization of interest groups	
0212	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with norms	
0213	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with national institutions	
0214	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with the regulatory state	
0220	→concerning financial costs	
0230	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with existing legislation	
0231	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with existing legislation: existence of a national	
0000	policy	
0232	\rightarrow directive requirements fit with existing legislation:no need to change the	
	national status quo	
	-Making Procedures	
0300	eu decision-making procedures	
0301	\rightarrow involvement of the european parliament	
0302	\rightarrow decision rule in the council of minsiters	
	tes Characteristics	
0400	member states' characterstics	
0401	\rightarrow (effective) number of parties	
0410	\rightarrow features of the political system	
0411	→ federalism	
0412	→→corporatism	
0413	\rightarrow veto players/points	
0414	→→corruption	
0415	\rightarrow degree of centralization	
0416	\rightarrow >regional autonomy	
0417	\rightarrow >level of democracy	
0418	\rightarrow type of democracy	
0419	\rightarrow type of the legal system	
0420	→economic and political features	
0421	\rightarrow weighted votes in the council of ministers	
0422	\rightarrow net contributors to eu budget	
0423	\rightarrow gdp (per capita)	
0424	\rightarrow economic power	
0425	\rightarrow population size	
0426	\rightarrow power index	
0430	\rightarrow national administration's characteristics	
0431	\rightarrow \rightarrow bureaucratic efficiency/resources	
0432	\rightarrow size of bureaucracy	
0433	\rightarrow + transposition load	
0434	\rightarrow fiscal resources	
0440	→coordination process features	
0441	\rightarrow involvement of national actors in the EU law-making process	
0442	\rightarrow number of ministries involved in the implementation process	
0443	\rightarrow political conflict between ministries	
0444	\rightarrow clear responsibilities for transposition	
0450 0451	→national control mechanisms	
0451	\rightarrow \rightarrow obligatory inspection	
0452	\rightarrow discretion of inspectors	
0453	\rightarrow difficulty if court access	
0454	\rightarrow presence of fire-alarm mechanisms	

0460	→culture characteristics	
0461	\rightarrow \rightarrow three worlds of compliance	
0462	\rightarrow respec of the rule of law	
0463	\rightarrow \rightarrow type of the negotiation culture	
0464	\rightarrow \rightarrow political culture	
0470	→other member states' characteristics	
0471	\rightarrow \rightarrow old members	
0472	\rightarrow new members	
	ent mechanisms	
0500	enforcement control mechanisms on the eu level	
0510	→infringement procedure	
0511	\rightarrow \rightarrow commission activity	
0512	\rightarrow \rightarrow court judgement	
0512	\rightarrow \rightarrow complaints by national actors	
0515	\rightarrow saliency for the commission	
0520	\rightarrow \rightarrow commission disagreement	
	ition process characteristics	
0600		
0610	transposition process characteristics	
	→type of legislation used	
0611	\rightarrow primary legislation	
0612	→ secondary legislation	
0613	→ teriary legislation	
0620	→issue linkage	
0621	\rightarrow + transposition package	
0630	\rightarrow critical event	
0631	\rightarrow external shock	
0632	$\rightarrow \rightarrow$ election	
	ent preferences	
0700	government preferences	
0710	\rightarrow law specific government positions	
0711	\rightarrow incentive to deviation	
0712	\rightarrow \rightarrow outvoted on the eu level	
0713	\rightarrow saliency	
0714	\rightarrow conflict in the council of minsiters	
0720	\rightarrow government specific positions	
0721	\rightarrow \rightarrow position on the left-right dimension	
0722	\rightarrow \rightarrow position on the eu dimension	
0723	\rightarrow \rightarrow ideological range in the government	
0724	\rightarrow \rightarrow ideological range in the parliament	
0725	$\rightarrow \rightarrow$ type of government	
Citizens' A	Attitudes	_
0800	attitudes of member states' citizens	
0810	\rightarrow attitudes towards the eu	
0811	\rightarrow support for eu membership	
0820	\rightarrow attitudes towards specific policies	
0830	\rightarrow attitudes towards other issues	
0030	\rightarrow support for democracy	
0830		
0831		
0831 Policy Lea	arning	
0831 Policy Lea 0900	arning policy learning	
0831 Policy Lea 0900 0901	arning policy learning →length of eu membership	
0831 Policy Lea 0900	arning policy learning	

1000 no appropriate category

Theoretical Argument of the Independent Variable

Description:	This variable indicates the general theoretical argument behind the analysis of each independent variable in the coded studies.
Variable name:	ivtheoryneu
Variable label:	
Value label:	ivtheoryneu.label/ivtheoryneulabel
For more information	4 Explanatory Factors: Theory and 4.1 Definition and Theory
refer to Database	and 4.2 General Code instructions
Codebook:	

value	ivtheoryneu		

Managem	ient School
010100	capacity
010101	Institutional decision-making capacity
010102	Few Interministerial coordination problems
010103	Administrative efficiency
010104	Positive public support
010105	Favourable culture
010600	Learning
Enforcem	ent School
020100	Preferences
020200	Supranational monitoring and enforcement
020300	National monitoring and enforcement
020400	Power (EU)
Other Ca	tegeories
010200	Good fit
010700	Low complexity of EU laws
040000	no appropriate category
050000	control variable

Effect of the Independent Variable on Compliance

Description:	This variable indicates the direction of the effect of the independent variable as specified in "ivtheoryneu" (good fit, interministerial cooprdination problems, administrative efficiency etc.) on compliance.
Additional Information	In order to make the direction of the effects of similar theoretical arguments comparable across studies, we adjusted the direction of the effects as they were reported in the studies. First we adjusted the reported effects to the specification of the

Variable name:	independent variable and the theoretical concept it represents. We looked whether the independent variable as specified and measured by the author e.g. indicates bureaucratic efficiency or bureaucratic inefficiency and then in this example reversed the effect of bureaucratic inefficiency. In this particular case all positive(negative) effects of bureaucratic inefficiency on compliance were set to be equal to a negative(positive) effect of bureaucratic efficiency on compliance. Second we further adjusted the effects to the reported measurement of the dependent variable. Here we looked whether the study analysis compliance (e.g. timely, correct transposition) or non- compliance (e.g. infringements, delay, non-notification) and reversed all effects on non-compliance. For example all positive(negative) effects of bureaucratic efficiency on non- compliance were set to be negative(positive) effects of bureaucratic efficiency on compliance. To make a concrete example , Mbaye (2001) finds that the variable "regional autonomy" has positive effect on non- compliance measured by the number of times a member state has reached the judicial phase of the infringement procedure. The existence of regional autonomy that might interfere into the transposition process implies that there are more veto players that influence the transposition process and thus the "institutional decision making capacity" of the member state is lower. Accordingly, Mbaye (2001) finds that <i>lower</i> level of institutional decision making capacity increases (has positive effect on) <i>non-compliance</i> , which we take as identical to saying that <i>higher</i> levels of institutional decision-making capacity are found to increase (have positive effect on) <i>compliance</i> . Following this logic, the variable "theoryeffect", in this particular case, shows that "institutional decision making capacity" increases compliance.
Variable label:	
Value label:	theoryeffect.label/theoryeffectlabel
For more information refer to Database Codebook:	Based on the codings explained in sections 4.3, 3.9 and 3.10.

Values	Value labels
0	positive
1	negative
2	unclear

Significance Level

Description:	This variable indicates the level of significance identified in the analysis of the study. We differentiated between quantitative
	and qualitative studies. While we coded differentiated

	information for the quantitative analyses, our coding of the qualitative study only distinguishes between confirmed or not confirmed.
Variable name:	significant
Variable label:	
Value label:	significant.label/significantlabel
For more information	3.11 Significance/Confidence Level
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

Values	Value labels
Inferential Statistics	
0	not significant p>0.05
1	significant 0.01<=p<0.05
2	highly significant p<0.01
10	significant: effect too
	complex
11	not significant: effect too
	complex
Case Studies	-
3	not confirmed
4	confirmed
5	strongly confirmed
Not Specified (all types of	
studies)	
9	unclear

5. Country Information

Country Dummies

Description:	For each study, the countries were coded that were included in the analysis. From this information, we generated a series of dichotomous variables listed below.
Variable name:	See list below
Variable label:	Country Name
Value label:	0 "not included"
	1 "included"
For more information	1.7. Sample Countries.
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

Variable name

austria belgium bulgaria cyprus czech republic denmark efta estonia finland france germany greece hungary ireland italy latvia lithuania luxembourg malta netherlands poland portugal romania slovakia slovenia spain sweden turkey uk

6. Policy field information

Celex Policy Fields (as of October 2010)

Description:	For each study, the policies were coded that were included in the
	analysis. From this information, we generated a series of dichotomous variables according to the EURLEX directory codes
	indicated below.
	Since none of the studies investigated in this article base their
	selection of policy fields on theoretical grounds, to identify common
	policy fields we followed the policy division in the directory codes
	on the European Union's website Eur-lex – Access to European
	<i>Union Law,</i> available at <u>http://eur-lex.europe.eu/en/index.htm</u> (last accessed 4 July 2012). We used the policy categorization from Eur-
	lex as of October 2010. Lately the European Union extended its
	competences in numerous policy fields and thus the number of
	policy fields also increased. The article does not include three policy
	fields which were added lately. These are "Regional policy and
	coordination of structural instruments", "Science, information,
	education and culture", "Common foreign and security policies".
	Celex policy field dummies were created using the policy field
	dummies from above.
Variable name:	See list below
Variable label:	Country Name
Value label:	0 "not included"
	1 "included"
For more information	1.3. Policy Fields
refer to Database	
Codebook:	

Variable name	Variable label (CELEX Policy Field)
env_cons_health	Environment, consumers and health protection
agr_fish	Agriculture & Fisheries
energy	Energy
labour_social	Freedom of movement for workers and social
	policy
justice	Area of freedom, security and justice
transport	Transport Policy
economy	Economic and monetary policy and free movement
	of capital
tax	Taxation
internal_market	Industrial policy and internal market
undertakings	Law relating to undertatings
services	Right of establishment and freedom to provide
	services
customs	Customs union and free movement of goods
competition	Competition policy
finance	General financial and institutional matters

exteriorExternal relationseucitizenshipPeople's europeall_no_differentiationNo specific policy field was specified by the author